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I. INTRODUCTION

For generations, scholars, scientists and legal practitioners have
recognized the inherent unreliability of eyewitness identification evidence,
and hundreds of exonerations in North America have now proven
definitively that eyewitness misidentification is the leading cause of
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wrongful conviction. Faced with overwhelming proof of the high
incidence of eyewitness error, American defense lawyers and social
scientists have struggled to modernize the law by encouraging law
enforcement agencies to implement more reliable identification techniques
and by urging courts to adopt measures to guard against admission of
tainted evidence. Despite the attention activists and scholars in the United
States have focused on eyewitness unreliability, they have devoted little
effort to exporting crucial reforms beyond the developed world to
countries where the paucity of legal resources puts criminal defendants in
greatest jeopardy of wrongful conviction. This is particularly unfortunate
because, despite the daunting lack of legal resources in many developing
countries, implementation of the most essential reforms of eyewitness
identification techniques would be a relatively easy, inexpensive means of
protecting the rights of the accused and drastically reducing the chances
of convicting innocent people. This Article will examine the potential for
eyewitness identification reform in the developing world, using Zambia as
a case study. Further, it will analyze the form of legal directive best suited
to effect that reform, with a comparative analysis of the development of
and debate over eyewitness identification law in the United States.
It is now indisputable that eyewitness misidentification is the leading
cause of wrongful conviction. As early as 1932, Edwin Borchard
recognized eyewitness error as the primary reason for conviction of
innocent people in his survey, Convicting the Innocent: Errorsof Criminal
Justice.1 Since then, the advent of DNA testing has proven beyond
question the severity of the problem.
Eyewitness misidentification contributed to more than 75% of the 225
convictions that have been overturned to date through DNA evidence.2
Moreover, in a study of 340 exonerations between 1989 and 2003,
including both DNA exonerations and non-DNA exonerations, Samuel
Gross and several of his colleagues calculated that 64% of the exonerees
had been identified by at least one eyewitness.' The cases in which DNA
evidence has been able to prove wrongful conviction definitively certainly

1. EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 367 (1932).

2. Innocence Project, Know the Cases, http://www. innocenceproject.org/know/(last visited
Dec. 14, 2008); Innocence Project, Understand the Causes, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
understandiEyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Dec. 14,2008). A 1996 study of 28 DNA
exonerations by the Department of Justice found eyewitness misidentification to be a major cause
of wrongful conviction in most of the cases studied. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L INST. OF
JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 24 (1996), www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf.
3. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States: 1989 through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 542 (2005).
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represent only a small portion of wrongful convictions based on mistaken
identification.
The crime most likely to yield testable DNA evidence is rape.4 Yet, to
take robbery (another crime where conviction will often depend on
eyewitness identification) as an example for comparison, in 2007, Federal
Bureau of Investigation statistics showed there were almost five times as
many robberies as rapes in the United States.' Virtually none of these
robbery cases would have produced DNA evidence capable of providing
conclusive proof of innocence.
Therefore, reform efforts to prevent wrongful conviction through
eyewitness misidentification must focus on preventing misidentification
in the first place. While the above studies focused primarily on North
American exonerations, there is no reason to believe the problem of
eyewitness error is any less severe in other parts of the world. If anything,
poorly enforced procedural safeguards and lack of resources in many
developing countries make the likelihood ofmisidentification even greater
than in the United States.
Although there is general agreement within the scientific community
about the reforms of identification procedures most critical to decreasing
the likelihood of eyewitness error, there is considerable debate about the
legal devices for ensuring compliance with best practices. In the United
States, this debate has often centered on the choice between rules or
standards as the most advantageous means of excluding tainted
identifications and admitting evidence that can provide reliable proof of
guilt. As developing countries begin to tackle the problems of eyewitness
identification reform, they, too, must consider the kinds of legal norms
best suited to protect legitimate and often competing interests in the
criminal justice system. This Article will place special emphasis on the
choice between rules and standards in eyewitness law and the question of
which, in the context of developing countries, would strike the optimal
balance between the important public interest in bringing criminals to
justice and the fundamental rights imperative of protecting the innocent
4. In the Gross exoneration study, the authors noted that only the availability of DNA
evidence in many rape cases could explain the fact that the 340 DNA and non-DNA exonerations
in the study included 121 rape cases but only six robberies. Moreover, while 87% of all rape
exonerations involved DNA evidence, only 19% of murder exonerations involved DNA, and the
vast majority of that 19% also involved rape. Id. at 530-31.
5. In 2007 there were 90,427 reports of forcible rape. In the same year, there were 445,125
robbery offenses. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States, 2007: Uniform Crime
Reports (2006), http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/offenses/violentcrime/forciblerape.html; http://
www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/offenses/violent-crime/robbery.html.
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against wrongful conviction. I will conduct this analysis by way of
comparison of the development of and debate over eyewitness law in the
United States with the situation in Zambia.
I hope this Article will contribute to current discourse in two ways.
First, while there has been much discussion about eyewitness reform in the
United States, there has been no scholarly consideration of the benefits and
challenges of implementing eyewitness identification reforms in the
developing world. Second, although this Article will consider the rulesstandards dichotomy in the specific context of eyewitness identification
reform in the United States and Zambia, the analysis may have broader
implications about the kinds of legal directives generally best suited to
developing countries. To date, the public discussion of rules and standards
has not assessed their comparative advantages in developing nations.
In Part II of this Article, I will discuss the general framework of the
rules-standards debate amongst legal scholars. In Part IH,I will discuss the
development of scientific knowledge about the fragility and imperfection
of eyewitness evidence. In Part IV, I will consider the historical evolution
of eyewitness law in the United States and of the various proposals for
improving on the current due process standard for excluding eyewitness
evidence, which the Supreme Court articulated over 30 years ago in
Manson v. Brathwaite.6 While few commentators on eyewitness law
reform have expressly referenced the broader discourse about the relative
benefits of rules and standards, reform proposals have followed the fault
lines of that debate. I will argue that, in the United States, whether reform
ultimately involves retaining a standard-like norm for evaluating
admissibility of eyewitness evidence or reverts to a rule-like per se
exclusion of all evidence tainted by improper police procedures is less
important than ensuring that the law develops to comport with scientific
evidence about eyewitness memory.
Part V will be an examination of Zambia's legal system, with a
particular focus on eyewitness identification practice, case law, and
potential barriers to reform. Despite the astounding lack of legal resources
in Zambia and other developing countries, simple, inexpensive reforms in
eyewitness identification procedures could provide a highly effective
safeguard for people with virtually no means of mounting effective
defenses against criminal charges or of challenging wrongful convictions.
Even countries with the most rudimentary legal infrastructures and with
the greatest shortages of legal personnel could execute these reforms
without unduly taxing extremely scarce resources, and the first step in that

6. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
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process should be to educate lawyers and jurists on the range of scientific
scholarship on eyewitness memory and best practices for identification
procedures. I will argue that governmental organization and political
realities in Zambia make use of bright-line rules to enforce improvements
in eyewitness identification procedures particularly desirable. Part VI will
conclude this Article.
II. RULES VERSUS STANDARDS

Countless observers, from professors to Supreme Court Justices, have
weighed in on whether rules or standards best translate underlying societal
values into substantive justice.7 While many have considered the issue
within a confined context, others have expounded broadly, with
generalized prescriptions for how courts should devise legal directives.8
Throughout these commentaries, a common set of arguments emerges
regarding the ostensible advantages and disadvantages of rules and
standards.
Before explicating those arguments, it is worth offering a brief
explanation of the common meanings legal scholars have in mind when
they talk about rules and standards. Rules, generally speaking, offer
precise, clearly delineated formulas for effectuating underlying policy
choices. Thus, a rule meant to effectuate the normative judgment that
emotionally and physically immature people should not operate motor
vehicles might read, "No one under the age of 16 shall be allowed to have
a driver's license." Standards, on the other hand, represent the attempt to
apply core value judgments directly. Thus a standard might read, "Driver's
licenses shall be issued only to people who are physically and emotionally
mature enough to exercise reasonable care on the road." In practice, many
legal directives fall on a continuum between pure rules and standards, but
the marginal paradigms are useful for explaining the contours of the
discourse.
It is obvious from the above examples that the choice between using
rules and standards can affect legal outcomes. This choice can have
7. For general overview ofthe debate, see, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OFLAW 121-50
(1961); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987); Duncan Kennedy,
Form andSubstance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976); Pierre Schlag,
Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379 (1985) (arguing that the debate is irresolvable and
irreducible, and that it is impossible to examine the dialectic outside of its own terms).
8. Authors have applied the debate to almost every area of law. Kennedy, supra note 7, at
1703. For a broader prescriptive argument, see, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. CI. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
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profound implications for both the manner in which courts deliberate and
the way social actors order their behavior. Following are some of the
traditional arguments about the form that legal directives should take.
A. The Role of the Judiciary
Rules, by their nature, constrain the decisionmaker to the relatively
narrow function of mechanical application of the legal directive. In theory,
rules leave little to no room for personal discretion, and the outcome of a
process governed by rules is predetermined from the outset.9 In contrast,
standards give the decisionmaker broad leeway to apply background
values directly and to tailor the decision to the specific facts of the
situation at hand.'o The choice of form, therefore, implies vastly different
conceptions of the judicial function.
In general, those who favor rules envision the judiciary's role as
confined to rote operation of norms, while other sectors of society
maintain responsibility for deliberating over and balancing the core values
associated with those norms. 1 In the United States, this position has
become linked with mainstream political conservatism,12 and it is now
common for political pundits promoting positions considered conservative
to decry the "activist" judiciary, lamenting over judges who make law
instead of merely applying it. However, as Kathleen Sullivan points out,
the association of rules with political conservatism is not a pre-ordained
alliance. 13 While the connection of popular conservative values with rulesbased decisionmaking has characterized recent discourse, in previous
incarnations of the rules-standards debate, the political relationships were
reversed. 14
Nonetheless, in a survey of the effects of rules and standards in private
law, Duncan Kennedy argues that rules and standards represent a
fundamental underlying conflict between the core values he labels

9. See, e.g., Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard. Qualified Immunity in the Age of
ConstitutionalBalancingTests, 81 IOWAL. REv. 261,282 (1995); Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme
Court 1991 Term: Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22, 58
(1992).
10. Chen, supra note 9, at 282; Sullivan, supra note 9, at 58-59.
11. Justice Antonin Scalia notes that the role of the legislature is to formulate broad
directives, while courts handle individual cases. Legislative norms that lack precision are criticized
as undemocratic because they leave too much discretion in the hands ofdecisionmakers not directly
accountable to the public. Scalia, supra note 8, at 1176.
12. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 26.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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"altruism" and "individualism." ' 5 In Kennedy's view, rules generally
promote individualism, which he characterizes as a philosophy ofpersonal
responsibility for one's profits and losses and the legitimacy of selfinterest as the basis for a legal system. 6 On the other hand, standards
promote personal sacrifice for the greater good and distributive justice. 7
Thus, it is possible to contextualize rules-standards arguments about the
proper role of the judiciary as part of an underlying debate about the
philosophical foundations of human society.
Keeping that division in mind, there are compelling arguments about
rules and standards and the proper function of the judiciary that operate
outside the confines
of the discourse of what Kathleen Sullivan calls
"street politics"' 8 and of philosophical divisions between individualism
and altruism. From Justice Antonin Scalia's perspective, a jurisprudence
of rules is fundamental to the very legitimacy of the judiciary in a
constitutional democracy. 9 According to Scalia, a system of rules protects
separation of powers by both constraining and emboldening the judiciary.20
On the one hand, by limiting the scope of judicial decisionmaking,
rules may prevent judges from interfering with the kinds of policy choices
many people feel are best left to the political branches of government.2' In
this regard, courts may strike down statutes that lack adequate precision
as unconstitutionally vague, for such vagueness leaves too much discretion

15. Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1685.
16. Id. at 1685, 1713, 1716.
17. Id.at 1685, 1717-18, 1736.
18. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 26.
19. Rachel M. Pickens, The Robin HoodTaking and the Court ofStandards,4 APPALACHIAN
J.L. 145, 146-47 (2005); Justice Scalia states that reliance on clear rules empowers the judiciary
to make controversial decisions against a popular majority, but the use of standards does not
provide a strong enough framework forjudges to resist excesses of popular will. Scalia, supra note
8, at 1180. Sullivan describes Justice Scalia's critique of standards as based on the notion that
standards invite judges to decide cases based on their own preferences and intuitions, thus
exceeding their constitutional authority. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 118.
20. Scalia, supra note 8, at 1179-80. As Frederick Schauer explains the confining nature of
rules, "the essence ofrule-based decision-making lies in the concept ofjurisdiction, for rules, which
narrow the range of factors to be considered by particular decision-makers, establish and constrain
the jurisdiction of those decision-makers." FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN THE LAW AND IN LIFE 231-32
(1991).
21. As Sullivan notes, virtually no one supports the unadulterated and naive view that judges
should refrain entirely from policy-based decisionmaking. Nonetheless, this was the stated concern
of the Reagan and Bush administrations when they asserted their policies of appointing judges who
would not "legislate from the bench." Sullivan, supra note 9, at 57-58.
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in the hands of people other than democratically elected representatives.
On the other hand, a system of rules empowers the judiciary by investing
judicial decisions with the imprimatur of impartiality. This is particularly
important because of the essential judicial function of protecting
fundamental Constitutional imperatives against "occasional excesses
of .... popular will. ' 23 If a judicial decision is the inevitable result of
predetermined rules of law, as opposed to an expression of the personal
policy preferences of the individuals on the bench, it is less susceptible to
attack.2 4 Coincidentally, Justice Scalia invoked a constitutional directive
in eyewitness identification law to illustrate this point:
It is very difficult to say that a particular convicted felon who is the
object of widespread hatred must go free because, on balance, we
think that excluding the defense attorney from the line-up process
in this case may have prevented a fair trial. It is easier to say that
our cases plainly hold that, absent exigent circumstances, such
exclusion is a per se denial of due process.25
In other words, if judges have the backing of clear rules to support their
decisions, they will be more likely to stand up to democratic pressure to
violate Constitutional norms. Such pressure may manifest itself merely
through public expression of popular sentiment, or it may take the form of
the elected branches of government attempting to operate outside their
constitutionally determined limits. 26 Thus, just as clear rules can confine
courts to operation within the judicial sphere, they can protect against
encroachment by other organs of government. This particular benefit of
rules over standards may have special relevance in the context of
developing countries, where the legislative and judicial branches are
particularly susceptible to domination by the executive.
Despite these arguments, others assert the superiority of standards as
a means of promoting responsibility and deliberation in the judiciary.28
These commentators tend to disbelieve the notion that rules can constrain

22. Scalia, supra note 8, at 1176.
23. Id at 1180.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Chen, supra note 9, at 283-84; see also Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning oftheFirst
Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CAL. L.REV. 821, 825-26 (1962); Sullivan, supra note
9, at 67-68.
28. Chen, supra note 9, at 283; see also Sullivan, supra note 9, at 67-68.
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judges from engaging in political decisionmaking in any case,29 and they
contend that formulating legal directives as rules allows judges to avoid
accountability for their holdings. The open balancing of standards, on the
other hand, compels judges to articulate rational arguments for their
judgments.3" By forcing explicit reasoning forjudicial decisions, standards
may promote substantive justice better than rules, which, critics of rulesbased decisionmaking say, merely mask underlying judicial policy
analysis. 3
B. Fairness
Defenders of both rules and standards tout their respective choice of
form as most likely to promote fairness. Those who favor rules tend to
stress the value of formal equality, arguing that rules oblige
decisionmakers to act consistently when faced with similar cases.32
Standards, on the other hand, permit the decisionmaker to manipulate the
results according to personal bias.33 However, as even the staunchest
defenders of rules-based decisionmaking concede, rules are both over and
under-inclusive at the margins, in actuality obliging judges to treat
substantively similar cases differently.34 For example, the rule that anyone
over the age of 18 may vote but that anyone under age 18 may not is meant
to ensure that the franchise is extended only to people with the maturity to
make informed, independent decisions about the candidates they choose.
However, this rule inevitably disenfranchises some mature people under
the age of 18 and permits voting by some impressionable and immature
people over the age of 18 who, in reality, are not capable of making free
and educated choices.
In contrast, a standard that allowed the decisionmaker to apply the
background values directly could accommodate the idiosyncrasies of
individual cases.35 Thus, if the legal directive read "Only those who are

29. Chen, supra note 9, at 283; Mendelson, supra note 27, at 825-26; Sullivan, supra note
9, at 68.
30. Chen, supra note 9, at 283; Sullivan, supra note 9, at 68.
31. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 68.
32. Id. at 62. Sullivan describes arguments for rules as including fairness as formal equality,
utility, liberty, and democracy. She then outlines traditional arguments for standards, including
rationales based on fairness as substantive justice, utility, equality, and deliberation. Id. at 62-69.
33. See also Chen, supra note 9, at 283; see also Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1688; Sullivan,
supra note 9, at 62.
34. Chen, supra note 9, at 283; see also Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1689; see also Sullivan,
supra note 9, at 58; see also SCHAUER, supra note 20, at 149-55.
35. Chen, supra note 9, at 282-83; see also Sullivan, supra note 9, at 66.
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capable of making knowledgeable decisions without undue influence or
coercion from outside parties shall be allowed to vote," decisionmakers
applying the standard could account for mature 17-year olds and
immature, incapable people over the age of eighteen. In terms of fairness,
then, a choice of rules must represent the belief that the danger of personal
prejudice from decisionmakers applying standards is worse than the
inability of rules to accommodate the range of particularized facts in cases
that fall outside the norm.3 6
C. Utility
Likewise, there are arguments on both sides of the rules-standards
debate about which form of directive maximizes social utility. Supporters
of rules point out that bright-line rules enhance utility in two ways. First,
clear rules eliminate the unpredictability of amorphous policy analysis by
decisionmakers and enable members of society to order their behavior
according to definite, foreseeable consequences.37 The ex ante uncertainty
attending standards, by contrast, can have a chilling effect on productive
activity.38 Second, rules advocates contend that rules put less stress than
standards on limited judicial resources.39 By providing simple formulas
applicable to a broad spectrum of cases, rules allow decisionmakers to
avoid intensive individualized balancing and policy analysis for each case,
which use of standards entails.
In response to these arguments, supporters of standards-based
decisionmaking assert that rules encourage socially unproductive behavior
because they allow people with bad motives to engage in immoral activity
while carefully skirting the boundaries of legal permissibility.4 ° Standards,
however, discourage undesirable conduct because those inclined to engage
in manipulative practices know that decisionmakers can apply the more
flexible legal directives to punish their harmful activities.41 Moreover,
although rules may tax judicial resources less in each case, standards are
a more adaptable form, with less necessity for frequent reconsideration as
society evolves.42

36. Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1689.
37. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 62.
38. Id.
39. Id.at 63.
40. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in PropertyLaw, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 600 (1988);
Sullivan, supra note 9, at 66.
41. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 62-63, 66.
42. Id.at 66.
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When considering the various arguments put forth in favor of rules and
standards, it is important to keep in mind Kennedy's warning about the
illusory appeal of overgeneralization. Kennedy notes that social
engineering arguments favoring one form of legal directive often appear
valid, but when examined further, turn out to be no more convincing than
reasoning in support of the opposite approach.43 In the next section, I will
demonstrate that the various proposals for formulating the due process
protection against admission of tainted eyewitness evidence as a rule or a
standard have measurable attendant benefits and costs.
I will argue, nonetheless, that in the United States, the balancing of the
respective advantages of rules and standards in eyewitness law must be
secondary to the imperative of ensuring that eyewitness law evolves to
reflect what the last generation of social science has demonstrated about
eyewitness memory and best practices for reducing misidentification and
that either form of legal directive can advance this goal in the United
States. I will argue in Part V, however, that the balancing of forms for
eyewitness law in Zambia demonstrates the clear superiority of bright-line
rules over standards. The twin dangers of executive subjugation of the
legislative and judicial branches and of extreme shortage of legal resources
may also make the choice of rules for eyewitness law in other developing
countries better than the use of standards. With Kennedy's admonition
about overgeneralization in mind," I restrict this conclusion to eyewitness
law. However, this analysis may have broader implications for the choice
of form generally in the context of the developing world.
Il. THE SCIENCE OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
Hugo Munsterberg, an academic psychologist, launched the first
wholesale attack on the legal system's faith in eyewitness testimony nearly
100 years ago, when he published On the Witness Stand.45 In the 1890s,
Munsterberg came to the United States to head Harvard's psychology
laboratory.46 In 1908, he published On the Witness Stand, cataloguing the
groundbreaking results of extensive experiments that demonstrated a level
of eyewitness fallibility previously unimagined and antithetical to intuitive

43. Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1704.
44. Id.
45.

HuGo MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIME

11-12 (1908).
46. Richard H. Ward, Preface to the New Edition of HUGO MUNSTERBERG'S ON THE
WITNESS STAND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIME (1908)
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notions about the nature of human memory.4 7 Munsterberg's exposition
revealed that not only were eyewitnesses likely to miss a huge percentage
of the details of what they saw, but they were also prone to remember
things that had never actually happened.48 Moreover, Munsterberg's
experiments showed that eyewitness confidence bore little relationship to
the accuracy of an identification.49
However, almost as soon as Munsterberg had published his research,
John Henry Wigmore, the eminent legal scholar and dean ofNorthwestern
Law School, published a response to Munsterberg's criticism in which he
pointed out that psychology had less to offer the legal profession than
Munsterberg claimed.5" While psychological experiments might be able to
demonstrate the general unreliability of eyewitness testimony,
Munsterberg's research provided no tool for discerning whether a
particular eyewitness was right or wrong and, thus, no means of reaching
more reliable verdicts. 5 Wigmore's criticism would continue to influence
psychologists studying eyewitness error for much of the next century. As
scientists studied the kinds of crime scene conditions that made
misidentification more or less likely, they had little practical advice to
offer the criminal justice system.52 By the time police and prosecutors had
contact with eyewitnesses, the crimes were over, and psychologists could
offer only retrospective analysis and general criticisms about eyewitness
unreliability.
However, in the last three decades, scientists have produced a vast new
body of research on variables within the control of the justice system that
affect the likelihood of misidentification. This research, based on what
social scientists have referred to as "system variables," reveals practical
procedural reforms that law enforcement agencies can implement to ensure
the highest probability of eyewitness accuracy.53 The results of this
research have nearly unanimous approval within the relevant scientific
community, and the Department of Justice has endorsed many of the

47. See generally MUNSTERBERG, supra note 45.
48. Id. at 50-51.
49. Id. at 55-56.
50. John Henry Wigmore, ProfessorMuensterbergand the Psychology of Testimony: Being
a Report ofthe Case of Cokestone v. Muensterberg, 3 ILL. L. REv. 399 (1909).
51. Id. at 421-24.
52. JAMES M. DOYLE, TRUE WITNESS: COPS, COURTS, SCIENCE, AND THE BATTLE AGAINST
MSIDENTIRCATION 49-63, 83-99 (2005).
53. Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness IdentificationProcedures:RecommendationsforLineups
andPhotospreads,22 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 603, 610 (1998).
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suggested reforms in its recommendations for law enforcement agencies
around the country.54
The major reforms social scientists have suggested are attempts to
address two overarching and overlapping problems. First, the proposed
reforms represent an effort to counteract the natural tendency of
eyewitnesses to make inaccurate identifications based on the relativejudgment process." Scientists have identified this process as the
inclination of witnesses to pick the person who most resembles the culprit
at an identification procedure, even when the real perpetrator is not present
or his photo is not included in the procedure. 6 Second, the proposals
address the problem of flaws in the design of a procedure or administrator
bias, which can influence the witness's choice by suggesting the identity
of the suspect. 7
Of course, if the actual perpetrator is present at an identification
procedure, the propensity of witnesses to use the relative judgment process
presents no problem. 8 The danger arises when the real culprit is absent
from a lineup, photo array, or, worst of all, a one-on-one showup
confrontation, and the witness uses relative judgment to identify the person
who most resembles the true criminal. 9 Numerous experiments have
shown that witnesses are likely to attempt an identification even when the
perpetrator is absent and that the witnesses will simply pick the person
who looks most like the real culprit.6"
Members of a specially appointed subcommittee of the Executive
Committee of the American Psychology/Law Society (APiLS) noted in
their recommendations for lineups and photospreads, that amongst the
most compelling experimental evidence for the role of the relative
judgment process in eyewitness identification is a procedure called
54. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP ON EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE,
RESEARCH REPORT: EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999).

55. Steven M. Smith et al., Postdictorsof Eyewitness Errors,7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
153, 155 (2001); Wells et al., supra note 53, at 10; Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness
Identification: PsychologicalResearch and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 765, 768-69 (1995).
56. Supra note 55.
57. Wells & Seelau, supra note 55, at 768-69.
58. Gary L. Wells, What Do We Know About Eyewitness Identification?,48 AM. PSYCHOL.
553, 560 (1993).
59. Wells & Seelau, supra note 55, at 768-69.
60. See, e.g., Robert S. Malpass & Patricia G. Devine, Eyewitness Identification: Lineup
Instructions and the Absence of the Offender, 66 J.APPL. PSYCHOL. 482, 482-89 (1981); Wells et
al., supra note 53, at 553-71; Gary L. Wells et al., The Selection of DistractorsforEyewitness
Lineups, 78 J. APPL. PSYCHOL., 835, 835-44 (1993); Gary L. Wells, The Psychology of Lineup
Identifications, J. APPL. SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 14, 89-103 (1984).
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removal without replacement.6" The experiment involves presentation of
a staged crime to eyewitnesses who are then broken into two groups. 62 The
experiment administrators show the first group a lineup including the
perpetrator, and then administrators record the witnesses' responses.63 The
administrators then show a second group of witnesses a lineup identical in
every respect, except that they have removed the culprit.' If eyewitnesses
base their identifications on true recognition, one would expect a similar
percentage of people who identified the real perpetrator from the first
lineup to pick "none of the above" when viewing the second lineup.65
However, the results show the majority of people who correctly identified
the culprit would simply have picked the most similar
looking remaining
66
absent.
was
criminal
actual
the
when
participant
While people have an inherent inclination to use relative judgments in
making identifications, flaws in the structure and composition of an
identification procedure can make misidentification more likely by
reinforcing the tendency to engage in the relative-judgment process. 67 For
example, when administrators of identification procedures tell a witness
there will be a suspect present at the procedure or even simply fail to warn
the witness the actual perpetrator may not be present, the chances the
witness will attempt to identify someone even when the real culprit is in
fact absent increase dramatically.6 8 Similarly, when administrators fail to
pick fillers (stand-ins who are not suspects and are known to be innocent)
for a lineup or photo array who resemble the witness's description of the
perpetrator, the suspect may stand out in a way that makes his

61. Wells et al., supra note 53, at 561, 614. As documented in the text and notes throughout

this section, the AP/LS subcommittee's recommendations reflect the results of a vast body of
research on the psychology of eyewitness identification.
62. Wells et al., supra note 53, at 614.

63. Id.
64. Id.

65. Id.
66. Id. at614-15.
67. Shirley N. Glaze, Selecting the Guilty Perpetrator:An Examination of the Effectiveness
ofSequential Lineups, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 199, 201-02 (2007) (noting a majority of studies
conclude that using sequential presentation of lineup participants reduces the effect of the relativejudgment process as compared to simultaneous presentation of the participants); Wells et al., supra
note 53, at 632 (noting that picking lineup participants to match the eyewitness's description of the
perpetrator can reduce the likelihood the witness will use the relative-judgment process to identify
an innocent suspect); Wells & Seelau, supranote 55, at 769 (noting the failure to give warnings
about possible culprit absence in a lineup increases relative judgment tendency).
68. Wells et al., supra note 53, at 615; Wells & Seelau, supra note 55, at 769; see also
Malpass & Devine, supra note 60, at 483.
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identification more likely, even if he is not the culprit.6 9 Finally, if the
administrator of an identification procedure knows the identity of the
suspect, she may influence the witness's choice.70 This influence may be
intentional, or it may be entirely inadvertent.7"
Unfortunately, witnesses who have viewed an identification procedure
with some suggestive component are more likely to feel confident about
the accuracy of their identifications than witnesses who took part in
uncorrupted procedures.7 2 After exposure to flawed procedures, witnesses

tend to remember having had better views of the perpetrator during the
crime, to remember having paid a higher degree of attention to the
perpetrator's features, and to feel more certain of the accuracy of their
identifications.7 3 The obvious and tragic irony is that the above described

flaws in identification procedures, while increasing the apparent reliability
of the eyewitness to an untrained observer, drastically reduce the chances
of accurate identification and increase the likelihood that witnesses will
pick innocent suspects when the real criminal is absent.74 Thus, the AP/LS
subcommittee has urged the implementation offour essential rules that can
maximize the effectiveness of lineups and photo arrays by reducing the
chances of misidentification without reducing the likelihood a witness will
be able to identify the real perpetrator if he is present.75

69. Wells et al., supra note 53, at 632; Wells & Seelau, supra note 55, at 780.
70. Amy L. Bradfield et al., The Damaging Effect of Confirming Feedback on the Relation
Between Eyewitness Certainty andIdentification Accuracy, 87 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 112,118 (2002);
Wells et al., supra note 53, at 627.
71. Bradfield et al., supra note 70, at 118; Erik Lilquist, The Role of the Death Penalty in
America: Reflections, Perceptions, andReform, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 897,926-27 (2007); Wells et
al., supra note 53, at 627.
72. See Bradfield et al., supra note 70, at 119; Gertrud Sophie Hafstad et al., Postidentification Feedback, Confidence and Recollections of Witnessing Conditions in Child
Witnesses, 18 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 901, 908-09 (2004); Gary L. Wells & Amy L.
Bradfield, "Good, You Identified the Suspect ": Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports
ofthe Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360, 361 (1998).
73. Jeffirey S. Neuschatz et al., The Effects of Post-Identification Feedback and Age on
Retrospective Eyewitness Memory, 19 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL 435, 441 (2005) (describing
effects of post-identification confirming feedback); Wells et al., supra note 53, at 626; Wells &
Bradfield, supra note 72, at 366 (describing effects of post-identification confirming feedback).
74. Wells & Seelau, supra note 55, at 780 (describing the benefits of picking lineup fillers
to match the description of the suspect); Bradfield et al., supra note 70, at 118 (stating the
importance ofdouble-blind administration oflineups); see generally Malpass & Devine, supra note
60 (examining the effect of lineup instructions warning the eyewitness of possible perpetrator
absence versus instructions suggesting the culprit is present).
75. Wells et al., supra note 53, at 627-36.
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A. Double-BlindAdministration ofIdentificationProcedures
Perhaps the most critical reform of eyewitness identification
procedures is to ensure they are conducted in accordance with one of the
most basic tenets of scientific experimentation-a double-blind
administration of the experiment. As the members of the AP/LS
subcommittee noted, an identification procedure such as a lineup or photo
array is essentially an experiment inasmuch as law enforcement personnel
have a hypothesis about the identity of the criminal (the suspect), and they
use the identification procedure to test the validity of that hypothesis.7 6 In
the case of an identification procedure, therefore, double-blind
administration would require that neither the witness nor the administrator
know the identity of the suspect prior to the administration of the
procedure."
It is common knowledge within the scientific community that
experimenter expectancy can influence the outcome of an experiment and,
thus, a fundamental rule of scientific experimentation is blind
administration.78 Unfortunately, the general practice of most law
enforcement agencies is to have personnel intimately familiar with the
details and investigation of a case administer identification procedures
themselves.79 While experimenter expectancy can bias the outcome of any
experiment, the close personal interaction between a lineup administrator
and a witness makes corruption of the procedure particularly likely.8 °
Suggestiveness from an administrator could be intentional, but even when
the administrator tries to run the procedure in good faith, she may
accidentally cue the witness with facial expressions, eye contact, or
through the tone of her voice. However, by using administrators who do
not know the identity of the suspect, law enforcement can easily eliminate
the possibility that eyewitnesses will be influenced by any kind of
suggestion from the administrator.82 This reform will inevitably increase
the chance that any choice a witness makes at an identification procedure
will be the product of that witness's true memory of the perpetrator.

76. Id. at618.
77. Id. at 627.
78. Id.; see also ROBERT ROSENTHAL, EXPERIMENTER EFFECTS INBEHAVIORAL RESEARCH
143-281 (1976).
79. Wells et al., supra note 53, at 627.
80. Id.
81. Bradfield et al., supra note 70, at 118; Wells et al., supra note 53, at 627.
82. Bradfield et al., supra note 70, at 118; Wells et al., supranote 53, at 627-28; Wells &
Bradfield, supra note 72, at 375; Wells & Seelau, supranote 55, at 775-76.
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B. Warnings About PossiblePerpetratorAbsence
Eyewitnesses are more likely to pick an innocent suspect when police
fail to warn them that the perpetrator may not be in the lineup or photo
array. Without such an instruction, the natural tendency of eyewitnesses
is to attempt an identification based on the un-contradicted assumption that
the culprit is amongst the participants in an identification procedure.83
However, a mere explanation to the eyewitness that the perpetrator may
or may not be present can reduce the rate of misidentification while having
"no appreciable reduction of accurate identifications" when the culprit is
present.84 This reduced rate of misidentification stems from the warning's
effect of legitimizing a "none of the above" response and, thus, reducing
the likelihood that the witness will use the relative-judgment process to
choose the participant who most resembles the criminal when the criminal
is not a participant in the procedure.8
C. Composition of the IdentificationProcedure
Ensuring that the suspect does not stand out from other participants is
another critical component in designing a reliable identification
procedure.86 The reasons for this rule are fairly straightforward. If the
suspect stands out in some way, it may be clear to the eyewitness who the
suspect is, and, as any scientist knows, one cannot rely on results from an
experiment in which the research subject is able to discern the
hypothesis.87
Thus, the AP/LS subcommittee recommended that, in general, law
enforcement should pick fillers for lineups and photo arrays who fit the
description the eyewitness gave of the perpetrator.88 For most situations,
compliance with this rule makes it likely both that the procedure will not
prejudice the suspect by calling special attention to him and that the
members of the lineup or photo array will not look so similar to each other
as to render the procedure ineffective.89 So long as the suspect fits the
general description of the perpetrator, picking fillers who also fit that

83. Wells et al., supra note 53, at 629-30.
84. Id. See also Malpass & Devine, supra note 60, at 487; Nancy Mehrkens Steblay, Social
Influence in Eyewitness Recall:A Meta-Analytic Review ofLineup Instruction Effects, 21 LAW &
HuM. BEHAV., 283, 287-89 (1997).
85. Wells et al., supra note 53, at 629.
86. Id. at 630.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 632.
89. Id.
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description reduces the chance that the witness will use the relativejudgment process to make an incorrect identification of an innocent
suspect.
In other words, if all members of the lineup or photo array fit the
description of the culprit, an eyewitness using relative judgment to attempt
an identification when the culprit is absent will be just as likely to identify
one of the fillers (already known to be innocent) as to identify the innocent
suspect.9" On the other hand, if police pick fillers at random, the suspect
is likely to be the only participant who resembles the description of the
criminal, and the odds the witness will mistakenly identify him increase
dramatically.91 Moreover, picking fillers based on the description of the
perpetrator will usually result in a lineup with enough variety that the
witness will be capable of making reasonable distinctions between the
participants.9" Descriptions of perpetrators are usually fairly general, and
matching the participants to the description will allow for a range of fillers
who look similar enough to the description to prevent the suspect from
standing out while at the same time not looking like a group of clones.93
This may happen if police match fillers to the appearance of the suspect,
and could render the witness's choice meaningless.94
Of course, the overall goal is to avoid drawing undue attention to the
suspect, and while the rule of matching fillers to the description of the
perpetrator will usually accomplish that aim, there are some situations in
which an alternative approach is superior.95 For example, if the suspect
himself does not resemble the description of the perpetrator, matching the
fillers to that description would cause the suspect to stand out.9 6 In these
situations, the AP/LS subcommittee recommends that police design the
identification procedure based on a combination of the description of the
criminal and the appearance of the suspect.97 Similarly, if the suspect has
a unique feature that was not a part of the witness's description of the
culprit, or if the suspect shares some feature with the culprit that the
eyewitness failed to include in the description, adherence to the general
rule of matching the fillers to the description of the perpetrator may run
counter to the rule's purpose.98 Thus, the overall rule is simply that the
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Wells et al., supra note 53, at 632.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wells et al., supra note 53, at 632-34.
Id. at 632-33.
Id.
Id. at 633-34.
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suspect should not stand out from the fillers. 99 Giving direction that police
should pick fillers based on the description of the perpetrator is, in most
cases, the most efficient way to effectuate that rule.
D. ContemporaneousConfidence Statements
Finally, the AP/LS subcommittee recommended that administrators of
identification procedures take confidence statements from eyewitnesses
immediately after the eyewitness has made an identification.'0 0 Given
extensive proof that post-identification events can artificially inflate an
eyewitness's memory of how confident she was at the time of an
identification, this rule is necessary to preserve an accurate record of the
eyewitness's level of certainty at the identification procedure.' To this
rule, I would add the recommendation that administrators of identification
procedures take statements before the procedure about the eyewitness's
opportunity to view the crime and level of attention at the time of the
crime, since experiments have proven suggestiveness in an identification
procedure also inflates the witness's memory of these factors.'0 2
It is, however, especially important to take contemporaneous
confidence statements, because confidence is the single most important
factor juries consider in gauging the accuracy of an eyewitness's
identification.'0 3 Yet, even under ideal circumstances, accuracy bears only
a modest relationship to confidence," ° and if the witness has encountered
post-identification suggestiveness, the jury may be particularly likely to
overvalue the meaningless, inflated in-court statement of eyewitness
confidence.
Perhaps the most commonly recommended reform not included in the
Executive Committee's four core rules is sequential presentation for
lineups and photo arrays. 01 5 Sequential presentation entails displaying
members of a lineup or photo array to eyewitnesses one-by-one instead of
99. Id. at 630.
100. Wells et al., supra note 53, at 635.
101. Bradfield et al., supranote 70; Neuschatz et al., supra note 73, at 441; Wells & Bradfield,
supra note 72, at 366-68; Wells et al., supra note 53, at 635.
102. Neuschatz et. al., supra note 73, at 441; Wells & Bradfield, supra note 72, at 366-67.
103. Wells et al., supra note 53, at 620.
104. See, e.g., R.K. Bothwell et al., Correlationof Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence:
Optimality Hypothesis Revisited, 72 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 691 (1987).
105. See, e.g., Glaze, supra note 67; R.C.L. Lindsay & Gary L. Wells, Improving Eyewitness
IdentificationFrom Lineups: Simultaneous Versus SequentialLineupPresentations,70 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 556 (1985); Nancy Steblay et al., Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Sequential and
Simultaneous Lineup Presentations:A Meta-Analytic Comparison,25 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 459
(2001).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2008

19

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 2

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 20

simultaneously.0 6 The witness is asked to make a decision about each
participant in the lineup or photo array before moving on to the next
person or photo.'07 Studies have shown that this procedural adaptation can08
reduce the tendency of witnesses to use the relative-judgment process. 1
With sequential presentation, witnesses are more likely to make absolute
judgments, comparing each person in a lineup to her memory of the actual
perpetrator. 109
While the AP/LS subcommittee considered sequential presentation
possibly the most important reform not included in its core rules, it
declined to adopt the reform as one of its primary recommendations." 0
First, the four core rules are each beneficial independently, whether or not
administrators implement other reforms."' The benefits of sequential
presentation, on the other hand, may disappear if police do not follow
other rules.
For example, the AP/LS subcommittee speculated that sequential
presentation without blind administration could produce less accurate
results than even non-blind simultaneous presentation because the
administrator of the procedure would know exactly whom the witness was
viewing at any given moment, thus producing a greater possibility of
administrator influence on the witness's choice." 2 Furthermore, while the
advantages of the other rules are intuitive and straightforward, the
potential value of sequential presentation is evident only with a more
sophisticated understanding of the relative-judgment process."'
Convincing courts, legislatures, and law enforcement to implement
sequential presentation could thus be more difficult than other reforms.
Finally, although the AP/LS subcommittee considered sequential lineup
presentation undeniably desirable, studies released since the
subcommittee's report have cast some doubt on the relative utility of
sequential lineups."' Thus, while sequential lineup presentation may

106. Wells et al., supra note 53, at 639.
107. Id.
108. Lindsay & Wells, supra note 105, at 562; Steblay et al., supra note 105, at 459; Wells
et al., supra note 53, at 639.
109. Steblay et al., supra note 105, at 460.
110. Wells et al., supra note 53, at 639.
111. Id. at640.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Roy S. Malpass, A Policy Evaluationof Simultaneous andSequentialLineups,
12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 394 (2006) (arguing that in most situations, simultaneous lineups
are superior to sequential lineups). A 2006 study of an Illinois pilot project reported higher rates
of false negatives with sequential lineups than with simultaneous lineups. See Sheri H.
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increase eyewitness accuracy, the current lack of consensus within the
scientific community makes adoption of this technique a somewhat
ambiguous proposition.
IV. AMERICAN LAW

While discourse between the scientific and legal communities about
eyewitness identification started with Munsterberg and Wigmore, most
accounts of modem eyewitness identification law in the United States
begin with a trilogy of cases the Supreme Court decided on the same day
in 1967. l l ' Before 1967, there was no constitutional regulation of

eyewitness evidence, and the general rule was that any flaw in a pretrial
identification procedure would affect only the weight and not the
admissibility of the evidence at trial."l 6 However, in UnitedStates v. Wade,
Gilbertv. California,and Stovall v. Denno, the Court held for the first time
that Sixth Amendment and due process rights require exclusion of some
eyewitness evidence. In United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California,
Justice Brennan wrote that a post-indictment lineup is such a critical stage
of the criminal process that, unless there is "'intelligent waiver,"' absence
of defense counsel at such a procedure requires per se suppression of the
lineup evidence at trial." 7 However, the Court held that the in-court
identification would still be admissible if the prosecution could establish

Mecklenberg,
PROGRAM

REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS: THE ILLINOIS PILOT
SEQUENTIAL DOUBLE-BLIND
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (2006),

ON

http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/gwells/IllinoisReport.pdf. However, another study of
the use of sequential double-blind identification procedures in Hennepin County, Minnesota found
the sequential double-blind procedures used in that jurisdiction worked well and yielded suspect
identification rates comparable to laboratory tests and comparable to rates in simultaneous lineups
in other jurisdictions. Amy Klobuchar et al., Improving Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin
County's Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot Project,4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 381, 410
(2006). Moreover, the Illinois report has been criticized as flawed because, while the sequential
procedures in the study were conducted by blind administrators, the administrators of the
simultaneous lineups knew the identities of the suspects. See, e.g., Daniel L. Schacter et al., Policy
Forum: Studying Eyewitness Investigations in the Field, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 3, 4 (2008).
Schacter and colleagues conclude more field studies are necessary to "produce a final blueprint for
procedural reform." Id. at 4-5.
115. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967);
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
116. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 382 (1968).
117. Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-42; Gilbert,388 U.S. at 272.
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that the identification was not the result of the tainted pre-trial procedure,
but, rather, the product of an independent source.'
In Stovall v. Denno, the Court held more generally that some
identification procedures may be "so unnecessarily suggestive and
conducive to irreparable mistaken identification" as to deny a defendant
due process of law and that courts must suppress such evidence." 9
However, the following year, the Court seemed to alter its approach to due
process analysis of eyewitness identification evidence. In Simmons v.
United States, considering the admissibility of evidence from a photo
identification, the Supreme Court emphasized the probability that the
defendant was actually guilty as a basis for its holding.' Highlighting the
witnesses' opportunities to view the perpetrator at the time of the crime
and their confidence in their identifications at trial, the court asserted that
the circumstances of the case "leave little room for doubt that the
identification of Simmons was correct, even though the identification
procedure employed may have in some respects fallen short of the
ideal."'' Eyewitness identification scholars have frequently urged that
Stovall provided robust protection of due process rights against admission
of tainted eyewitness evidence, and that the Simmons decision represented
the beginning of the Court's unraveling of that protection. 2 ' As Professor
Charles Pulaski noted in 1974, Stovall was a strict test protecting against
admission of eyewitness identification evidence obtained through use of
unreliable procedures, while Simmons was a more permissive approach,
focusing on a broader conception of reliability by inquiring into the
likelihood that the identification was actually accurate.' 23

118. Gilbert, 388 U.S. at272.
119. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301-02.
120. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 385-86.
121. Id.
122. Jessica Lee, No Exigency, No Consent: Protecting Innocent Suspects from the
Consequences of Non-Exigent Show-Ups, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 755, 785-89 (2005);
Timothy P. O'Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited: Towards a New Rule of
Decisionfor DueProcess Challengesto Eyewitness IdentificationProcedures,41 VAL.U. L. REV.
109, 122-25 (2006); David E. Paseltiner, Twenty Years of DiminishingProtection: A Proposalto
Return to the Wade Trilogy's Standards, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 583, 589-90 (1987); Charles A.
Pulaski, Neil v. Biggers: The Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade Trilogy's Due Process
Protection,26 STAN. L. REV. 1097, 1104-10 (1974); Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Rethinking the Right
to Due Processin Connection with PretrialIdentificationProcedures:A Proposalto Return to the
Wade Trilogy's Standard,79 KYL.J. 259,264-68 (1991); Dori Lynn Yob, Mistaken Identifications
Cause Wrongful Convictions: New Jersey's Lineup Guidelines Restore Hope, But are they
Enough?, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 213, 229-30 (2002).
123. Pulaski, supra note 122, at 1104-09; see also Lee, supra, note 122, at 786-87.
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Finally, in 1977, the Court formulated its current due process standard
for admissibility of eyewitness evidence in Manson v. Brathwaite.124 In
Manson, the Court clearly announced its preference for a reliability-based
standard rather than one designed to exclude evidence obtained through
procedural impropriety. 25 The Manson Court determined that, in the event
of unnecessarily suggestive procedures, courts should examine five
reliability factors to determine whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, the evidence is nonetheless reliable and, therefore,
admissible.126 Justice Blackmun, adopting the standard the Court had set
forth in Neil v. Biggers, said courts should consider: 1) the opportunity of
the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; 2) the witness's
degree of attention; 3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description of the
criminal; 4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation; 27and 5) the length of time between the crime and the
confrontation. 1
From the foregoing overview, it is easy to see how the development of
eyewitness identification law fits into the discourse on legal forms. The
Stovall holding can be viewed as a more rule-like formulation: if the
procedure is unnecessarily suggestive, then the evidence from that
procedure is per se inadmissible. The core due process value of fairness is
expressed through the exclusion of evidence obtained from flawed
procedures. Like all rules, the Stovall holding had the potential for overinclusiveness. Some witnesses might be able to make reliable
identifications of perpetrators despite the police using unnecessarily
suggestive identification procedures, but the requirement of per se
suppression of such procedures prevented the prosecution from bolstering
in-court identifications with introduction of the pre-trial identification
evidence.
On the other hand, the Manson test is more standard-like: even if there
is a faulty procedure, courts should look at the totality of the
circumstances, using the five factors as guidelines to determine whether
the identification was reliable. Under Manson, courts attempt to apply the
background value of fairness more directly by trying to determine whether,
in spite of a procedural defect, the witness actually identified the defendant

124. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198
(1972)) ("It is the likelihood of misidentification which violates a defendant's right to due
process ... Suggestive confrontations are disapproved because they increase the likelihood of
misidentification.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 113-14.
127. Id. at 114.
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correctly. In other words, the evidence will still be admissible if it seems
likely the defendant is actually guilty. This individualized, discretionary
approach asks judges to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the flawed
evidence might nonetheless be reliable enough to be used in court.
Those who have written about the development of eyewitness
identification law have tended to view Stovall as giving strong due process
protection against faulty eyewitness evidence. These scholars have seen
Manson as the Court's final betrayal of the rights guaranteed by Stovall.'28
Additionally, of the five states that have rejected Manson, three adopted
formulations similar to the Stovall holding, believing that test to be more
protective of due process rights.' 29
Indeed, it is certainly true that Manson has proven inadequate as a
safeguard against the admission of suggestive identification evidence. As
noted above, three of the five reliability factors are artificially inflated in
the wake of suggestive procedures, thus producing the ironic result that the
use of suggestive identification procedures like post-identification
feedback makes it more likely that courts will find the identification to
have been reliable despite the unnecessary suggestiveness. In practice,
courts have been extremely unlikely to use Manson to suppress suggestive
identification evidence. In the only two published attempts to conduct
anything approaching comprehensive analysis of judicial treatment of
Manson, William J. Mueller noted that federal courts found eyewitness
identification evidence unreliable and inadmissible in only two cases
between May 1, 1983 and April 30, 1984, and Robert F. Redmond, Jr.

128. Lee, supra note 122, at 788-89; O'Toole & Shay, supra note 122, at 125; Paseltiner,
supra note 122, at 592-93; Rosenberg, supra note 122, at 261; Yob, supra note 122, at 230.
129. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Mass. 1995) ("In cases involving
an unnecessarily suggestive identification, we have adhered to the stricter rule of per se exclusion
previously followed by the Supreme Court and first set forth in the Wade-Gilbert-Stovalltrilogy.");
People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 384 (N.Y. 1981); State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 584-85
(Wis. 2005).
[W]e adopt standards for the admissibility of out-of-court identification evidence
similar to those set forth in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Stovall
v. Denno... We hold that evidence obtained from such a showup will not be
admissible unless, based on the totality of the circumstances, the showup was
necessary.
Dubose, 699 N.W.2d at 584-85. Utah and Kansas accepted Manson's notion that unnecessarily
suggestive identification techniques might still be admissible if the identification was reliable, but
rejected the five-factor reliability test in favor of factors meant to comport with updates in scientific
knowledge. State v. Hunt, 69 P.3d 571, 577 (Kan. 2003); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780-81
(Utah 1991).
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similarly found that there had been only two such federal suppressions
between May 1, 1984 and April 30, 1985.130 Such results are unsurprising
given Justice Blackmun's rejection in Manson of a per se exclusionary
rule, which he recognized would provide greater incentives for police to
avoid suggestive procedures, in favor of a norm that would allow
admission of evidence that is "reliable and relevant.' ' 3 There is general
agreement amongst eyewitness scholars, however, that courts
applying
32
Manson regularly admit evidence that is far from reliable.
Yet it is far from clear that retention of the Stovall holding would
necessarily have enhanced due process protection for defendants in
eyewitness cases or, more generally, that a rules-based regime would set
the optimal balance between safeguarding defendant rights in eyewitness
cases and allowing juries to hear evidence that can, in fact, provide reliable
proof of guilt. First, despite the assertions of commentators that the
Supreme Court's shift away from Stovall represented the abandonment of
a more protective due process norm, this notion appears, on closer
inspection, dubious at best. As Rudolph Koch and Benjamin Rosenberg
have noted, the Court in Stovall failed33to distinguish between out-of-court
and in-court identification evidence.
Consequently, some courts applying Stovall interpreted the opinion as
requiring a single test for both the out-of-court and in-court
identifications. 34 Other courts, however, read Stovall in line with Wade
and Gilbert as requiring a two-part inquiry: if the out-of-court
identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, that evidence would
be excluded, but the in-court identification would still be allowed if it had
an independent source. 135 In fact, the three states that have rejected
Manson in favor of a Stovall-like approach have all adopted the two-part
test, excluding unnecessarily suggestive out-of-court identification

130. Robert F. Redmond, Jr., Identifications,74 GEO.L.J. 586, 591 n.693 (1986); William J.
Mueller, Identifications, 73 GEO. L.J. 362, 367 n.626 (1984).
131. Manson, 432 U.S. at 112.
132. See generally Lee, supra note 122; O'Toole & Shay, supra note 122; Paseltiner, supra
note 122; Rosenberg, supra note 122; Ruth Yacona, Manson v. Brathwaite: The Supreme Court's
Misunderstandingof Eyewitness Identification,39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 539 (2006); Yob, supra
note 122.
133. Rudolph Koch, Process v. Outcome: The ProperRole of CorroborativeEvidence in Due
ProcessAnalysis of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1097, 1110 (2003);
Rosenberg, supra note 122, at 265-66.
134. Koch,supra note 133, at 1110.
135. Id. (citing Smith v.Coiner, 473 F.2d 877, 880-83 (4th Cir. 1973); Rudd v.Florida,477
F.2d 805, 809 (5th Cir. 1973)).
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evidence per se but allowing the in-court identification if the prosecution
can demonstrate an independent source for it.36
Yet this formulation provides virtually no protection for defendants and
no real deterrent to police using suggestive procedures. As Richard Rosen
pointed out in criticizing the independent source tests of Wade and Gilbert,
prosecutors are generally perfectly satisfied with introducing only the incourt identification. 137 In fact, when evidence from an out-of-court
identification is introduced, it is usually by the defense in an effort to
attack the reliability of the eyewitness's testimony. 138 The in-court
identification, however, will almost always be satisfactory to the
prosecution, for, as Elizabeth Loftus has noted, "[a]ll the evidence points
rather strikingly to the conclusion that there is almost nothing more
convincing than a live human being who takes
the stand, points a finger at
39
"1
one!
the
'That's
says,
and
the defendant,
But perhaps the most telling evidence of Stovall's ineffectiveness is the
case law produced in the nine months and six days between that decision
and the supposed start of its undoing in Simmons. Of the 27 published
federal cases that cited Stovall between June 12, 1967 and March 18, 1968,
when the Supreme Court decided Simmons, ten considered directly
whether admission of eyewitness identification evidence constituted a due
process violation under Stovall." 0 Nine of those ten courts found that there
136. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Mass. 1995); People v. Adams, 423
N.E.2d 379, 384 (N.Y. 1981); State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 596 (Wis. 2005).
137. Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 237, 249 (2006).
138. Id.
139. ELIZABETH LoFTus, EYEWITNESS TESITMONY 19 (1979).
140. Hanks v. United States, 388 F.2d 171, 174 (10th Cir. 1968) (finding admission of the
identification evidence did not contravene the defendant's due process rights despite use of a
showup identification, without identifying any urgent reason for conducting the showup, which
occurred "sometime after the arrest of Hanks"); United States v. Wright, 404 F.2d 1256, 1259-61
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (remanding the case to the district court for further development of the facts to
determine whether there was a due process violation); United States v. Ball, 381 F.2d 702, 703 (6th
Cir. 1967); United States v. Beard, 381 F.2d 325,328 (6th Cir. 1967); United States ex rel. Bennett
v. Myers, 381 F.2d 814, 816-17 (examining suggestiveness under the totality of the circumstances
and finding no problem in case in which habeas petitioner had not raised the issue himself); Borum
v. United States, 409 F.2d 433, 436 n. 10 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (noting that appellant had not claimed
under Stovall that identification was "so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable
mistaken identification that he was denied due process of law," the Courts held, without
comprehensive analysis, that the record does not suggest there was a due process violation); Crume
v. Beto, 383 F.2d 36, 38-41 (5th Cir. 1967); Meier v. United States, 384 F.2d 743, 744 (9th Cir.
1967) (citing Stovall, without any explicit analysis, and providing a cursory statement that
"[n]othing in the record suggests a denial of due process"); United States v. Quarles, 387 F.2d 551,
556 (4th Cir. 1967) (citing Stovall for the proposition that Wade and Gilbert are not retroactive, the
Court goes on to say there was no violation of defendant's Fifth Amendment rights, even if he was
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had been no due process violation, and one remanded to the district court
for further development of the facts.'' Of the ten cases, at least three
involved showup identifications, 142 and at one of those showups police
made the defendant say the word "hurry" to assist with the
identification. 43 In other words, of published federal cases, not a single
court applying Stovall in the time before its supposed adulteration used the
decision to suppress pre-trial identification evidence, let alone in-court
identification evidence, even when that evidence was the product of highly
suggestive procedures.'44
Of the 87 published state cases that cited Stovall before the Simmons
decision, 31 directly considered whether due process required suppression
of eyewitness evidence under Stovall. 4 Three of these courts held that

compelled to say "hurry" in a showup situation at a bank); Wise v. United States, 383 F.2d 206,
209-10 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (holding there was no due process violation under Stovall despite use of
a showup identification).
141. The only case in which a federal court applying Stovall's test (in the months before
Simmons) to determine whether unnecessarily suggestive eyewitness identification evidence
constituted a due process violation did not definitively determine there was no due process violation
was United States v. Wright. The Wright court remanded the case for further development of the
facts. Wright, 404 F.2d at 1259-61.
142. Hanks, 388 F.2d at 173-74; Quarles,387 F.2d at 553-54; Wise, 383 F.2d at 207-08.
143. Quarles,387 F.2d at 556.
144. See generally Stovall, 388 U.S. at 293.
145. Bowman v. State, 208 So. 2d 241,242-43 (Ala. Ct. App. 1968) (holding there was no due
process violation where witness identified defendant and co-defendant at a show-up in which they
were the only two black people in the room); Denmon v. State ex rel Eyman, 437 P.2d 999 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1968) (holding, without discussing the circumstances of the identification, that facts
alleged did not "render the confrontation 'conducive to irreparable mistaken identification."');
People v. Caruso, 68 Cal. 2d 183, 187-88 (Cal. 1968) (finding a due process violation under Stovall
where defendant did not resemble any of the other four men in the lineup and reversing with option
for state to prosecute again and prove independent source); People v. Harris, 67 Cal. 2d 866, 872
(Cal. 1967) (holding, without discussing specifics of the identification procedure, that lineup
adequately guaranteed due process of law); People v. Feggans, 67 Cal. 2d 444,448-49 (Cal. 1967)
(holding there was no due process violation when witness identified defendant from four or five
pictures and again at showup); People v. Slutts, 259 Cal. App. 2d 886, 891-93 (Cal. App. 2d 1968)
(holding there was due process violation where officer drew beard on defendant's picture and no
other pictures from photo array before one of witnesses made an identification, and, ultimately, that
the violation was harmless error and, thus, did not require reversal); People v. Blackburn, 260 Cal.
App. 2d 35, 43-44 (Cal. App. 2d 1968) (holding identification did not violate due process despite
possibility that witnesses were shown pictures of defendant before identifying defendant from
lineup and despite fact that perpetrator wore a fake nose, mustache, and glasses); People v. Smith,
259 Cal. App. 2d 814, 819-21 (Cal. App. 2d 1968) (finding photographs of the defendant shown
to witnesses before in-court identification were not used to "prime" witnesses, so there was no due
process violation); People v. Douglas, 259 Cal. App. 2d 694, 697-98 (Cal. App. 2d 1968)
(remanding to trial court to resolve a factual dispute as to whether officer singled out defendant in
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lineup); Bradley v. State, 206 So. 2d 657, 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (citing Stovall for the
proposition that Wade and Gilbertwere not retroactive, but continuing by holding that showup was
not "so repugnant to the concepts of fair treatment as to vitiate the conviction or even to render the
evidence inadmissible."); Marden v. State, 203 So. 2d 638, 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (finding
no due process violation where witness identified defendant at a showup while defendant sat in a
police car); People v. Harris, 236 N.E.2d 281, 282-83 (I11. App. Ct. 1968) (finding no due process
violation where officer told witness, "We got the man," before one-on-one identification at police
station); People v. Neiman, 232 N.E.2d 805,809-10 (111. App. Ct. 1967) (holding that nothing from
identifications at lineup or preliminary hearing indicated presence of due process issues); Reeves
v. State, 238 A.2d 307, 309-10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968) (citing Stovall for proposition that Wade
was not retroactive and going on to say that defendant had not shown his lineup was conducted in
an unfair or unreliable manner, and thus evidence was admissible); Powell v. State, 231 A.2d 737,
739 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967) (holding that there was no showing the lineup was unfair or
unreliable, citing Stovall, though defendant's challenge had been based on argument that
identification violated his state rights because he was displayed in lineup behind a screen, where
he could not see his accusers); State v. Keeney, 425 S.W.2d 85, 90 (Mo. 1968) (finding no due
process violation where witness identified the defendant in a showup at the scene of the crime
shortly after the crime); State v. Pollard, 425 S.W.2d 106, 108 (Mo. 1968) (confusing Wade,
Gilbert, and Stovall, the Court mistakenly asserted that a due process objection based on a claim
that procedure was "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification"
did not apply retroactively, but court went on to dismiss objection to one-on-one showup
identification because, the Pollardcourt said, there was an independent source); State v. Blevins,
421 S.W.2d 263, 266-67 (Mo. 1967) (holding no due process error where, before showup
identification, police told one of witnesses, "We got the man. Will you come down and identify
him."); State v. Batchelor, 418 S.W.2d 929, 933-34 (Mo. 1967) (holding identification did not
violate due process despite fact that witness identified defendant in a lineup in which defendant was
only woman, appearing with three men); State v. Hill, 419 S.W.2d 46, 48-49 (Mo. 1967) (holding
there was no due process violation where witness identified defendant in a showup at police station
seven days after crime); State v. Sears, 155 N.W.2d 332, 334 (Neb. 1967) (holding there was no
due process violation where defendant was identified in a showup, sitting in the back seat of a car
with two plain clothes officers in front); Burton v. State, 437 P.2d 861, 862-63 (Nev. 1968)
(holding there was no due process violation where four of the six lineup participants were suspects);
Calbert v. State, 437 P.2d 628, 628-29 (Nev. 1968) (holding there was no due process violation
where officer told witnesses there was a possible suspect in lineup); State v. Sinclair, 231 A.2d 565,
575-76 (N.J. 1967) (holding that showup identification in hospital on night of crime did not
constitute a due process violation); State v. Matlack, 231 A.2d 369, 373 (N.J. 1967) (holding there
was no due process violation where all witnesses had identified defendant in showups within a day
of crime); People v. Ballott, 20 N.Y.2d 600, 605-07 (N.Y. 1967) (remanding for decision on
whether there was an independent source despite an unnecessary showup identification); People
v. Brown, 20 N.Y.2d 238, 242-43 (N.Y. 1967) (holding there was no due process violation even
though the witness identified defendants, two black men, while they were alone in room with white
police officer, two or three weeks after the crime); Commonwealth v. Choice, 235 A.2d 173, 17475 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967) (holding identification did violate due process despite fact that witnesses
were brought into interrogation room where they observed part of interrogation and then identified
defendant); State v. Nelson, 156 S.E.2d 341, 343 (S.C. 1967) (finding no due process violation in
lineup composed of only three men, conducted two months after the crime); Graham v. State, 422
S.W.2d 922, 924-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (holding there was no due process violation, the Court
noted there was nothing irregular about the lineups indicated in record); Fogg v. Commonwealth,
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unnecessarily suggestive procedures had violated the defendants' due
process rights.' 46 However, not a single one of the state courts definitively
used Stovall to suppress an eyewitness's in-court identification or to
reverse a lower court judgment on the basis of admission of an unreliable
in-court identification; in two of the three opinions holding there had been
a due process violation, the courts gave prosecutors the opportunity to
prove there was an independent source for the in-court identification,' 47
and in the third opinion, the Slutts court held the due process violation was
harmless error.148
Moreover, in the vast majority of the state cases, courts found no due
process problems whatsoever. Many of these cases involved egregiously
flawed identification procedures. 149
Clearly, courts applying Stovall in the months before Simmons were not
using that test to suppress the vast majority of the suggestive identification
evidence that came before them. The likelihood of admission of in-court
identifications and the rarity of suppression even of any pre-trial
identification evidence under Stovall belie the popular notion that retention
of that due process test would have provided significantly greater
protection for defendants in eyewitness cases than Manson. The reason
both Manson and Stovall-like formulations have proven inadequate likely

159 S.E.2d 616, 620-21 (Va. 1968) (holding there was no due process violation where witness
admitted that Commonwealth's attorney may have said, prior to her identification, "The next man
the police bring through that door will be the man in those pictures.").
146. Caruso, 68 Cal.2d at 187-188; Slutts, 259 Cal. App. 2d at 891-893; Ballot, 20 N.Y.2d at
605-07.
147. Caruso, 68 Cal. 2d at 189-90; Ballot, 20 N.Y.2d at 606-07.
148. Slutts, 259 Cal. App. 2d at 892-93.
149. Batchelor, 418 S.W.2d at 933, in which the eyewitness identified the defendant in a
lineup in which she was the only woman, appearing with three men; Brown, 20 N.Y.2d at 242, in
which the eyewitness identified the defendants at a showup at which they were the only black men
in the room, accompanied by a white police officer, two to three weeks after the crime; Choice, 235
A.2d at 177, in which the eyewitness identified the defendant at a showup in an interrogation room,
after observing police interrogate the defendant; Nelson, 156 S.E.2d at 343, in which the eyewitness
identified the defendant in a lineup consisting of only three people, two months after the crime;
Fogg, 159 S.E.2d at 621, in which the eyewitness admitted the commonwealth's attorney may have
said "The next man the police bring through that door will be the man in the pictures," prior to the
identification; Bowman, 208 So. 2d at 242, in which the eyewitness identified the defendant and
his co-defendant at a showup in which they were the only black men in the room; Harris, 236
N.E.2d at 282-83, in which a police officer told the eyewitness, "We got the man," before the
showup identification; Blevins, 421 S.W.2d at 265, in which a police officer told one witness, "We
got the man," before the identification procedure; Hill, 419 S.W.2d at 48, in which the eyewitness
identified the defendant in a showup at the police station seven days after the crime; Burton, 437
P.2d at 863, in which four of the six participants in the lineup were suspects; and Calbert,437 P.2d
at 628, in which a police officer told witnesses there was a possible suspect in the lineup.
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has less to do with their formulations as either discretionary, case-by-case
standards or bright-line rules than with the fact that neither test has
provided courts with sound scientific guidance about the kinds of
procedures most likely to lead to eyewitness misidentification. 50 While the
Stovall Court acknowledged correctly that showup confrontations had been
"widely condemned,"'' it provided no further explanation of the kinds of
practices that could potentially render an identification procedure
"unnecessarily suggestive."' Of course, the Manson Court's holding was
even less in accord with what science has now taught us about human
psychology and eyewitness identification in that the Manson reliability
factors are in direct conflict with science.153 Far from helping to shed light
on whether there is a reliable identification despite suggestive elements,
the three subjective, self-reporting reliability factors are likely to indicate
a higher degree of reliability as a result of that very suggestiveness, thus
bolstering the worst procedures when courts use the factors to assess the
totality of the circumstances.154
The Stovall Court derived a rule-like directive to deal with due process
limits on admission of eyewitness evidence, and the Manson Court
replaced that approach with a standard-like norm for dealing with the
problem, but the overarching shortcoming of both decisions is that neither
reflects what social scientists have now learned about eyewitness
identification.' 55 Ultimately, either a per se exclusionary rule for
unnecessarily suggestive identification evidence or a totality of the
circumstances test for reliability would enhance due process protections
for criminal defendants, so long as the directive provides guidelines in
accordance with what science has taught us are the most crucial reforms
for eyewitness identification procedures. For example, a Stovall-like rule
could provide effective protections if it stated explicitly that courts should
consider unnecessarily suggestive any procedure not conducted doubleblind; procedures without contemporaneous witness statements of
confidence and of opportunity to view and degree of attention at the time
of the crime; procedures in which the fillers are not picked so as to avoid
special emphasis on the suspect; and procedures in which police did not
warn the eyewitness that the culprit may or may not be present.

150. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301-02; Manson, 432 U.S. at 114-16.
151. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302.
152. Cf Stovall, 388 U.S. at 293 (no explanation on what might constitute "unnecessarily
suggestive").
153. Manson 432 U.S. at 117.
154. Id. at 110-12.
155. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302; Manson, 432 U.S. at 110-12.
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Likewise, a more Manson-like reliability test would still enhance due
process protection so long as it included guidelines similar to those stated
above for examining the "unnecessary suggestiveness" prong of the test
and so long as it eliminated the subjective, self-reporting factors from the
reliability analysis and replaced them with more scientifically sound
criteria.'56 In other words, whether courts retain a standard-like totality of
the circumstances test to determine ultimate admissibility, despite
unnecessary suggestiveness, or revert to a per se rule that unnecessarily
suggestive evidence must be suppressed, there is great need for a rule-like
directive to guide courts in making at least the initial determination of
whether the identification procedures were unnecessarily suggestive.
Largely because they have not provided this kind of guidance, the few
states that have rejected Manson have provided inadequate steps toward
meaningful reform.' 57
Massachusetts, New York, and Wisconsin have reverted to Stovall-like
rules, with per se exclusion of unnecessarily suggestive pre-trial
identification evidence. Utah and Kansas have retained a reliability test but
revised the factors in an attempt to conform with recent science.'58 The
shortcomings of all of these directives are the allowance for possible
admission of in-court identifications, despite flawed pre-trial procedures,
in Massachusetts, New York, and Wisconsin, and the lack of guidelines in
any of the Manson-rejectingstates as to what sorts of procedures qualify
as being unnecessarily suggestive in the first place. 5 9
Of course, a Stovall-like rule that effectively guides courts as to the
most egregious techniques, which must be considered unnecessarily
suggestive, would exclude more evidence than a Manson-like standard,
with a two-part analysis that provides similar guidance as to the
"unnecessarily suggestive" prong but then engages in further analysis to
determine reliability under the totality of the circumstances. With the
former, the examination ends with the first step of determining
unnecessary suggestiveness, and the latter allows for the possibility of
admission even when the identification procedures are unnecessarily
suggestive. Timothy O'Toole and Giovanna Shay have argued for revision
of the constitutional standard in a manner similar to the above suggestion
for a more effective version of Stovall, with per se exclusion of evidence
that falls below certain minimum guidelines.16 °O'Toole and Shay compare

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Manson, 432 U.S. at 110.
See supra text accompanying note 129.
See supra text accompanying note 129.
See supra text accompanying note 129.
O'Toole & Shay, supra note 122, at 136-41.
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their proposal to prophylactic rules such as those mandated by Mirandav.
Arizona, 161 and their arguments adhere6 closely to the framework of the
broader rules versus standards debate.
Yet reform of either test to reflect modem science would greatly
increase due process protections, and it is not clear the rule-like
formulation for determining admissibility would strike the best balance
between protecting fundamental rights and ensuring the admission of
reliable evidence of guilt. In the end, then, whether the second stage of
eyewitness analysis should remain a totality of the circumstances standard
or revert to a per se exclusionary rule, there must be a rule-like
formulation to guide courts in making the first-stage determination of
whether the identification procedures were unnecessarily suggestive.
Without that guidance, courts applying both Stovall and Manson have
allowed egregiously unreliable evidence into court.

V. ZAMBIAN LAW

After gaining independence from Britain in 1964, Zambia followed the
path of many other post-colonial African countries; encouraging early
signs that vigorous democracy might take hold gave way all too quickly
to centralized, authoritarian dictatorship.'63 Within a decade of
independence, Zambia's first president, Kenneth Kaunda, had abandoned
any pretense of pluralistic democracy, outlawing all political parties but
his own under a one-party constitution.'
Zambia's independence
constitution had blended elements of the United States Constitution and
the Westminster model, with an executive president and a parliament, but
even the independence constitution had set the country up for executive
dominance.165 Although 75 of the 80 members of parliament were elected,
five were nominated by the president."6 Moreover, the president would
choose cabinet ministers, who were to serve at his pleasure, from

161. Id. at 140.
162. In discussing potential criticisms of their proposal for affirmative minimum guidelines
for identification procedures and the alternative of retaining a standard-like balancing test, O'Toole
and Shay consider traditional rules and standards arguments about utility, predictability, and the
role of the judiciary. Id. at 144-47.
163. Muna B. Ndulo & Robert B. Kent, The Constitutionsof Zambia, 30 ZAMBiA L.J. 1, 11
(1998).
164. Id. at 11. For further discussion of the transformation to one-party rule, see B.O.
NWABUEZE, PRESIDENTIALISM IN CoMMONwEALTH AFRICA 222-25 (1974).

165. Ndulo & Kent, supra note 163, at 6.
166. Id. at 8.
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parliament.167 This scenario substantially compromised legislative
independence.
The judiciary initially featured a constitutionally created Court of
Appeal (now called the Supreme Court), with unlimited appellate
jurisdiction, and a High Court, with unlimited original jurisdiction. 6 8 At
the bottom of the hierarchy were subordinate courts, overseen by
magistrates, and local courts, which primarily administered customary
law.' 69 Subordinate courts and local courts were authorized by statute
rather than by constitutional mandate. 7 ' While judges of the Court of
Appeal and of the High Court could be officially removed only for
infirmity or misbehavior, the President largely controlled their initial
selection. 7 ' Additionally, the President could appoint sitting judges to
non-judicial government positions, thus forcing them to resign from the
bench.'72 President Kaunda used this practice to remove judges whose
opinions he disfavored, creating an obvious detriment to judicial
independence.' 73
Moreover, throughout the 27 years of Kaunda's rule, Zambia remained
in an official state of emergency.174 The state of emergency established the
legal pretense for widespread detentions without trial. 175 This practice is
a serious encroachment on the ostensibly protected fundamental individual
rights enumerated in the constitutions enacted during the period. 176 Even
after the reintroduction of multi-party politics with the adoption of
Zambia's Third Republican Constitution in 1991, the new President,
Frederick Chiluba, continued to declare states of emergency
periodically.177 As documented in the United States Department of State's

167. Id. at 7.
168. Id. at 9.
169. Id.
170. Ndulo & Kent, supra note 163, at 9.
171. The President appointed judges to the Court of Appeal and the High Court with advice
from a Judicial Service Commission, and the choice of Chief Justice was purely a presidential
prerogative. Id. The requirement for parliamentary ratification ofjudges was not introduced until
1991, with the implementation of Zambia's third post-independence constitution. Id. at 18.
172. Id. at 9.
173. Id.
174. John Hatcher, States of Siege/Emergency in Africa, 37 J. AFRICAN L. 104, 104 (1993).
175. Ndulo & Kent, supra note 163, at 10.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., MSN Encarta, Frederick Chiluba, http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_
761584047/FrederickChiluba.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008); BBC News, State of Emergency
Extended in Zambia, Jan. 30 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/51863.stm (last visited
Oct. 20, 2008); BBC News, Zambian President Defends State of Emergency, Jan. 16, 1998,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1hi/world/africa/48059.stm (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
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most recent human rights report on Zambia, the Zambian government
continues to disregard prohibitions on arbitrary arrest and detention.'78
Executive dominance in Zambia has been entirely typical of postindependence Commonwealth Africa.' 79 This executive supremacy may,
to some extent, have been an inevitable consequence of the highly
centralized colonial administrations that emerging African states inherited
and replaced. 8 ° Additionally, traditional African attitudes toward authority
figures may have contributed to the extreme consolidation of power in a
single political leader.' The ascendancy of African political leaders at the
expense of judicial power to enforce individual rights has also been
justified as necessary to propel economic development in these countries,
which remain amongst the world's poorest.'82 Whatever the reasons and
justifications for this state of affairs, it has, without question, prevailed at
the expense of fundamental rights of individual citizens.'83
In addition, widespread government corruption in Zambia threatens the
integrity ofjudicial decisionmaking.' 84 Such corruption, largely a symptom
178. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 2006
Zambia, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (2007) [hereinafter Zambia, 2006],
availableat http://www.state. gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78764.htm.
179. Executive dominance and subjugation of other organs of government were the norm in
early post-colonial Commonwealth Africa. Examples include the authoritarian governments of
Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Milton Obote
(followed by Idi Amin) in Uganda, and the military dictatorships of Nigeria. See generally
NWABUEZE, supra note 164. While expressing some optimism for the potential for reform spurred
by pressure from international donors, Muna Ndulo discusses executive dominance throughout
Southern Africa. Muna Ndulo, Presidentialismin the Southern African States and Constitutional
Restraint on PresidentialPower, 26 VT. L. REv. 769, 769-772 (2002).
180. The new African regimes inherited "the full panoply of colonial legislation, orders,
ordinances, by-laws, and judicial precedents.., upon which colonial authority had been based."
H. Kwasi Prempeh, Marburyin Africa: JudicialReview and the Challengeof Constitutionalismin
ContemporaryAfrica, 80 TUL. L. REv. 1239, 1265-66 (2006). Ultimately, it was "the inherited
(subconstitutional) legal order, not the new constitutions, [that] 'offered African elites real power
and the bureaucratic machinery with which to exercise it effectively."'Id. at 1266 (quoting H.W.O.
Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions Without Constitutionalism:Reflections on an African Political
Paradox,CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

71 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993)).
181. NWABUEZE, supra note 164, at 106-10.
182. The ideology of development came to be a wholesale justification for the continuation
of the authoritarian aspects of colonial regimes and the subversion of rights-based
constitutionalism. Prempeh, supranote 180, at 1266-68. Writing in 1974, B.O. Nwabueze discussed
how the development rationale had been used to suppress individual rights and freedoms and to
diminish judicial power, while enhancing the authority of political leaders. NWABUEZE, supra note
164, at 354.
183. Prempeh, supra note 180, at 1265.
184. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, COUNTRY
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of Zambian poverty, is prevalent at least in part because investigative units
lack sufficient personnel to effectively police the problem. 185 As a result,
government corruption frequently goes unchecked by the Zambian justice
system, and officials regularly demand illegal payments with impunity.'86
While corruption is a problem in all branches of Zambian government, the
Zambian judiciary is no exception.' 87 For obvious reasons, this situation
compromises the reliability of the Zambian justice system.
While both dominance of the executive and threats to judicial
independence have certainly endangered the rights of criminal defendants
in Zambia, perhaps the biggest threat to the rights of the accused
throughout Zambian history has been the deficiency of resources available
to criminal defendants. Despite a Constitutional right to a defense
attorney, 188 the astounding dearth of lawyers available to represent
criminal defendants renders that right virtually meaningless. According to
the United States Department of State, Zambia's legal aid department
employed only 14 lawyers to represent indigent defendants throughout the
entire country in 2005.189 Additionally, there are only 584 registered
lawyers in private practice in all of Zambia.' 90 These lawyers must conduct
the entirety of the legal work for a nation of 11.5 million,' 9' and the vast
majority of them are not representing the largely indigent criminal
defendants brought before the courts. 192 Although a statute passed in 2000
established a legal aid fund to induce private practitioners to represent
indigent defendants, the success of the act depended on voluntary
affiliation from private attorneys. 193 Up to this point, despite the

HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 2007 Zambia, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(2008) [hereinafter Zambia, 2007], available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2007/10051 1.htm.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. ZAMBIA CONST. (Constitution Act 1991) art. 18.
189. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2005, Zambia (2006) [hereinafter Zambia,
2005], availableat http://www.state.gov/g/ drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61599.htm. In 2000, the legal aid
department employed only nine lawyers. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2000, Zambia
(2001), availableat http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/ hrrpt/2000/af/index.cfin?docid=849.
190. Interview with Edward Sakala, Executive Sec'y of the Law Ass'n of Zambia, in Lusaka,
Zambia (Jan. 28, 2008).
191. Zambia, 2006, supra note 178.
192. See Zambia, 2005, supra note 189.
193. Writing in 2000, Alfred Chanda expressed pessimism about the viability of the legal aid
fund. Chanda noted the fund's success depended not only on a large number ofprivate practitioners
REPORTS ON

PRACTICES
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constitutional guarantee, few criminal defendants receive legal
assistance.' 94 Moreover, the roster of available lawyers shrinks daily as the
country's devastating HIV epidemic continually claims the lives of more
and more Zambians.' 95
According to the most recent data, there are now nearly 15,000 people
in Zambian prisons. 196 More than a third of these prisoners have not yet
had trials. 97 Of the prisoners who have been convicted of crimes, the right
to appeal is rendered meaningless by the lack of access to qualified
defense lawyers.' 98 With only a handful of attorneys regularly representing
the thousands of people in Zambian prisons, effective justice for anyone
accused or convicted of a crime in Zambia is a truly remote possibility.' 99
Threats to the rights of criminal defendants due to lack of access to
legal representation are compounded by the inadequacy of legal training
for Subordinate Court magistrates.200 These magistrates oversee a large
percentage of criminal trials in Zambia, yet very few of them are
lawyers.2"' Additionally, though most magistrates are required to undergo
legal training at the National Institute of Public Administration, the vast
majority do not have university degrees.20 2 The fact that most Zambian
magistrates are not legal professionals increases the likelihood that those
presiding over criminal trials in Zambia lack the analytical sophistication
necessary to sort through complex legal issues surrounding the cases that
come before them.

signing up, but also on adequate funding, which historically had been unavailable to any
government institution other than the presidency. Alfred Chanda, Gaps in the Law and Policy in
the Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Zambia, 32 ZAMBIA L.J. 1, 15
(2000).
194. Zambia, 2005, supra note 189.
195. According to statistics from the U.S. Agency for International Development, 16% of
Zambian adults are HIV positive. USAID/Zambia, HIV/AIDS Multisector, http://www.usaid.
gov/zm/hiv/hiv.htm (last visited on Oct. 20, 2008).
196. Zambia, 2006, supra note 178.
197. According to the Zambia Human Rights Commission, there were 14,427 inmates in
Zambian prisons in mid-2005. Of these, 4,938 were still awaiting trial. Zambia, 2005, supra note
189.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Marie Chine, Supporting Zambian Judicial Capacity to Handle Corruption Case, 10
(Robin Hodess, Transparency International 2008), http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/query.cftn?id=169
(last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
201. Interview with Ford M. Chombo, Deputy Registrar of the Supreme Court of Zambia, in
Lusaka, Zambia (Dec. 28, 2007). In 2007, only 12 of 136 magistrates in Zambia were lawyers.
Zambia, 2007, supra note 184.
202. Interview with Ford M. Chombo, supra note 201.
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The perils posed by Zambia's extreme lack of legal resources certainly
heighten the already serious risk posed by the inherent unreliability of
eyewitness memory. Without the real possibility of effective legal
representation, the likelihood that courts will be made aware of potential
flaws in identification techniques is extremely low. Nonetheless, in the
rare cases in which criminal defendants and appellants have had lawyers
asserting their rights in court, the Zambian Supreme Court has been
remarkably apt at recognizing the probability of error, and, in many cases,
has reversed convictions at least in part because of faulty eyewitness
evidence. °3
The Supreme Court has, in fact, provided significant protection for
defendants by requiring corroborative evidence in cases where eyewitness
identification evidence is flawed. 2° While Zambian courts generally
determine whether eyewitness evidence is too weak to stand alone based
on the totality of the circumstances,2 "5 the Supreme Court has, in rule-like
fashion, held broadly that in the event of unfair administration of a lineup,
there is a per se requirement for corroborating evidence for a conviction
to stand.2" 6 Moreover, the Court has identified some basic circumstances,
in which a lineup will be considered unfair.20 7
This alone makes Zambia's choice of legal directive for eyewitness
evidence more effective, in many ways, than the pure totality of the

203. See, e.g., Lubinda v. The People (1988) Z.L.R. 110 (Zambia) (overturning conviction
where police failed to conduct a lineup without explanation, where cause of death of victim was
not definitively established, and where description of watch worn by victim did not match the
watch produced in court); Lukolongo & Others v. The People (1986) Z.L.R. 115 (Zambia)
(reversing convictions of two of four appellants where appellants stood out in lineup because they
were not wearing shoes and where confessions were not voluntary); Situna v. The People (1982)
Z.L.R. 115 (Zambia); Chimbo & Others v. The People (1982) Z.L.R. 20 (Zambia) (overturning
convictions where police made one appellant sit on a bench with other appellants and only one
other man and asked eyewitness to identify the appellant, where confessions may have been
involuntary, and where prosecution witness may have had motive to lie); Crate v. The People
(1975) Z.L.R. 232 (Zambia) (reversing conviction where trial court failed to consider the possibility
of honest mistake by the single eyewitness identifying the appellant); Bwalya v. The People (1975)
Z.L.R. 227 (Zambia) (overturning conviction where only credible evidence against appellant was
the uncorroborated identification of a single eyewitness); Tiki & Others v. The People (1975)
Z.L.R. 194 (Zambia) (overturning conviction of one appellant where one prosecution witness failed
to pick him from a lineup and only other evidence was the uncorroborated spontaneous
identification of another witness).
204. Lukolongo (1986) Z.L.R. at 131.
205. The People v. Phiri & Siagutu (1980) Z.L.R. 249, 257 (Zambia).
206. Lukolongo (1986) Z.L.R. at 128.
207. Id.
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circumstances test in Manson.2 8 By requiring corroboration in all cases
where police conduct a lineup unfairly, Zambia has provided a real
incentive for law enforcement personnel to construct and administer
lineups without prejudicing suspects. In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court
has not identified any situation that courts must consider per se
unnecessarily suggestive, triggering reliability analysis under the totality
of the circumstances test. As a result, courts in the United States, without
any guidance on the issue, have frequently held egregiously suggestive
procedures not to be unnecessarily suggestive. 9 Moreover, even in cases
where courts applying Manson do find a procedure unnecessarily
suggestive and reach reliability analysis, three of the five reliability factors
remain in direct conflict with scientific knowledge about eyewitness
memory. 1 0
Furthermore, though Zambian courts also look at the totality of the
circumstances to determine the strength of eyewitness evidence in cases
not involving an unfairly conducted lineup, the Zambian totality analysis
may be somewhat more trustworthy than that used by courts in the United
States because Zambian courts do not rely on all the misleading Manson
factors. Rather, the only factor from Manson that Zambian courts seem to
rely on is the opportunity to view. 211 Though this factor, like confidence
and degree of attention, may be skewed by suggestive procedures, it is also
subject to at least some degree of objective verifiability.
Even so, the Zambian approach leaves too much room for error.
Zambia's eyewitness law remains insufficient for three reasons. First,
although the Supreme Court requires per se corroboration for unfair
lineups, Zambian courts have not yet recognized many of the most
important lessons of modem eyewitness science.21 2 As a result, courts are
left in the dark on the full range of factors that make identification
evidence undependable. Much like the Stovall rule, 1 then, Zambia's
eyewitness law is somewhat ineffective despite its formulation in rule-like

208. Manson v. Brathwaite, 97 S. Ct. 2243 (1977).
209. Id. at 135.
210. Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive EyewitnessIdentificationProceduresand
the Supreme Court'sReliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science 30 Years Later,LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. (2008) (in press).
211. See, e.g., Chinyama & Manda v. The People, S.C.Z. Appeal No. 157 of 1995 ("The sole
question which the court had to answer was whether the opportunity available to the witness [to
view the perpetrator] was good or not.").
212. There is no record in Zambian case law of any judicial notice of any of the social science
on eyewitness identification. Zambian courts have, however, identified a variety of situations that
render an identification procedure unfair. See infra text accompanying notes 233-248.
213. Stovall v. Denno, 87 S. Ct. 1967 (1967).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol20/iss3/2

38

Kahn-Fogel: Beyond Manson and Lukolongo: A Critique of American and Zambian E

2008] BEYOND MANSON AND LUKOLONGO: A CRITIQUE OF AMERICAN AND ZAMBIAN EYEWITNESS LAW

317

terms, because it is not fully informed by scientific evidence on best
practices for eyewitness identification. Second, though the requirement of
corroborative substantiation provides some protection for defendants
facing flimsy eyewitness evidence, the courts do not require suppression
of the faulty evidence.21 4 Rather, the flawed identification evidence
remains admissible and is bolstered by any corroborating evidence. 2 5 This
allows for the inclusion of unreliable data in support of a conviction, a
serious impediment to obtaining accurate results in criminal trials.
Finally, in Zambia, the corroborating evidence may itself be the fruit
of procedures violating the defendant's rights. In a 1976 decision,216 the
Zambian Supreme Court rejected the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio.2 17
The Court held that physical evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional right to privacy is admissible because, despite its improper
acquisition, it is relevant. 28 The result is that Zambian defendants may be
convicted by a combination of unreliable eyewitness identification
evidence and illegally obtained physical evidence. Clearly, the odds
remain overwhelmingly against the accused.
A closer examination of a sample of Zambian eyewitness cases will
help to illuminate the contours of that system's strengths as well as its
ultimate inadequacy and need for reform. In 1986, in Charles Lukolongo
and Others v. The People,2" 9 the Supreme Court articulated two principles
that define Zambia's current approach to eyewitness law. In Lukolongo,
the four appellants had been convicted of aggravated robbery and murder
of two security guards in the course of robbing offices of the National
Breweries and the Forest Department. 22' They were all sentenced to
death.22 1 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellants' lawyer claimed
the lineup at which three of the four appellants were identified was unfair
because the appellants were the only participants not wearing shoes.222
This, according to counsel, was a deliberate attempt by the police to make
it easy for witnesses to identify the appellants.2 23 While Justice Chomba
noted that, in fact, two of the remaining lineup participants were also

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

See, e.g., Kabala & Masefu v. The People (1981) Z.L.R. 102, 106 (Zambia).
Id.
Liswaniso v. The People (1976) Z.L.R. 277.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961).
Liswaniso (1976) Z.L.R. at 287.
Lukolongo & Others v. The People (1986) Z.L.R. 115.
Id. at 116.
Id.
Id. at 128.
Id.
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shoeless, the Court held, nonetheless, that the shoelessness of the
appellants rendered the lineup unfair.224
The Court then made two sweeping rulings with the potential to
provide powerful protection against flawed eyewitness evidence. Relying
in part on British precedent, the Court held that corroborating evidence is
necessary to rule out the possibility of mistaken identification in all cases
in which eyewitness evidence is of poor quality.225 This statement by the
Lukolongo Court was of great importance for Zambian law.
Though previously the Court had frequently required corroborative
evidence in eyewitness cases, especially in cases where only a single
eyewitness had made an identification,226 Zambian courts had never before
categorically stated that there must be additional evidence corroborating
guilt to secure a conviction every time eyewitness evidence is flawed. In
fact, the High Court, quoting a British treatise in a 1973 decision, had
summed up the prior state of Zambian eyewitness law, saying, "[t]here is
no rule of law or practice requiring corroboration of an identifying
witness... It has, however, become the practice to warn juries to examine
all evidence of visual identification with care, and unreliable evidence of
identification may lead to a conviction being quashed . . .
From
Lukolongo onward, however, the Zambian courts have consistently held
that in cases where judges determine that eyewitness evidence is of poor
quality, there can be no conviction without corroborating evidence.228
While the Lukolongo Court provided no specific guidance on how
judges should generally assess the quality of eyewitness evidence,
previous decisions reveal that Zambian courts should usually evaluate the
229
strength of such evidence based on the totality of the circumstances.
Seven years before Lukolongo, the High Court, considering eyewitness
identification evidence in another robbery case, held that "[o]f course the
adequacy of evidence of personal identification always depends on all the
circumstances surrounding each case which must be decided on its

224. Lukolongo (1986) Z.L.R. at 115.
225. Id. at 131 (citing R v. Turnbull & Another, 1976 All E.R. 549).
226. See, e.g., Mkandawire & Others v. The People (1978) Z.L.R. 46, 53 (Zambia); Tiki &
Others v. The People (1974) Z.L.R. 194, 195 (Zambia); Bwalya v. The People (1975) Z.L.R. 227,
230 (Zambia).
227. Zaloumis & Hill v. The People (1973) Z.L.R. 67, 70 (Zambia) (quoting John Frederick
Archbold et al., Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases 1009 (Sweet& Maxwell 37th
ed. 1969).
228. Mtonga & Kaonga v. The People (2000) Z.L.R. (Zambia); Kalonga v. The People (1988)
Z.L.R. 90, 91 (Zambia).
229. People v. Phiri & Siagutu (1980) Z.L.R. 249, 257 (Zambia).
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merits. 230 Using similar language, in considering the heightened potential
for error in cases of single-eyewitness identifications, the Supreme Court
confirmed in Mvuma Kambanja Situna v. The People that the operative
norm for evaluating eyewitness evidence is the totality of the
circumstances, stating that, "[i]f, in all the circumstances, the opportunity
for a positive and reliable identification is poor, then it follows that the
possibility of an honest mistake has not been ruled out unless there is some
other connecting link between the accused and the offence which would
render a mistaken identification too much of a coincidence., 231 Inother
cases, the Court has, with greater precision, focused its analysis of the
"opportunity for a positive and reliable identification" on the opportunity
of the witness to view the perpetrator at the time of the crime.232
Although the Lukolongo Court's unconditional statement that
eyewitness identification evidence of poor quality always requires
corroboration certainly marked a milestone for Zambian eyewitness law,
the holding represented merely a clear-cut articulation of what had already
been common practice in Zambian courts. For, as documented above,
Zambian courts before Lukolongo had often required corroborative proof
of guilt in cases where eyewitness evidence was weak. Yet the Lukolongo
Court also issued an unquestionably revolutionary directive on unsound

230. Id.
231. Situna v. The People (1982) Z.L.R. 115, 117 (Zambia).
232. See, e.g., Ngati, Chishimba & Chanda v. The People (2003) Z.L.R. (Zambia) (considering
a case of single-witness identification, Justice Chriwa noted that the trial judge had been satisfied
the eyewitness "had ample opportunity to observe the assailants and that her evidence was
reliable..."); Manongo v. The People (1981) Z.L.R. 152, 155 (Zambia) (considering a case where
two eyewitnesses had identified the appellant in a showup, and one of the eyewitnesses had
mistakenly identified someone else in a lineup, Chief Justice Silungwe wrote that the trial court had
found both eyewitnesses to be truthful and reliable, emphasizing that the robbery "occurred during
bright daylight [and] lasted for about ten minutes, during which time the witnesses said they had
a good opportunity to observe and recognise the assailants..."); Silungwe & Banda v. The People
(1981) Z.L.R. 286, 290-91 (Zambia) (assessing a robbery appeal in which an eyewitness had been
unable to pick appellants from a lineup until police ordered appellants to stretch out their hands so
the eyewitness could identify them from injuries, the Court considered the witness's "opportunity
to observe his assailants" at the time of the crime along with the evidence of the tainted lineup and
agreed with the trial judge's conclusion that "'the crux of the matter is whether [the eyewitness]
had ample time to observe the two people adequately for purposes of visual recognition to rule out
any possibility of mistaken identification."'); Mushala & Others v. The People (1978) Z.L.R. 58,
62 (Zambia) (ruling that two lineups were unreliable, in part because police had shown the
witnesses photos of the suspects before the lineups, the Court noted defense counsel's argument
that the identification evidence was unreliable as a whole because an eyewitness had seen the
perpetrator in circumstances "so momentary and fleeting that [the witness] could not have had
sufficient opportunity to observe the driver in the vehicle... and therefore the danger of an honest
mistake could not be ruled out.").
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identification procedures. After deciding the absence of shoes on the
appellants rendered the lineup unfair, the Court ruled that evidence from
unfairly conducted lineups can never, without corroborating evidence, be
the basis for a conviction.23 3 Ultimately, because of the flawed lineup, and
because the government's offered corroborating evidence for two of the
four appellants was also weak, the Lukolongo Court reversed the
convictions of those appellants.234
Though the Lukolongo opinion did not specify the full range of
techniques that might create unfairness in a lineup procedure, Justice
Chomba did discuss basic practices Zambian courts had frowned upon.235
Addressing the situation in Lukolongo itself, the Court condemned as
unfair any lineup in which police allow suspects to appear "manifestly and
conspicuously different from the others as regards dress., 236 Justice
Chomba also remarked that police should not allow eyewitnesses to see
suspects at the police station before conducting a lineup.237
Judges in previous cases discussed additional circumstances that
current courts might use as guidelines on what constitutes an unfair lineup.
In Toko v. The People, decided eleven years before Lukolongo, the
Supreme Court held that it is improper for a witness who has made an
identification at a lineup to have contact with a witness who has not yet
seen the lineup.238 Interestingly, the Toko Court seemed on the verge of
creating even stronger protection than the Lukolongo Court, as Justice
Silungwe wrote that police doing anything to prevent a lineup from being
"proper, fair and independent" could, "in a proper case, nullify the
239
identification.
Since Toko, the Supreme Court has, in one case, quoted this language
with approval.2"' But the Court did not definitively state what would
constitute a "proper case" or precisely what it meant by "nullify," and it
has never relied on Toko to actually quash eyewitness identification
evidence, as opposed to merely requiring corroboration. 241 Nonetheless, in
Mtonga and Kaonga v. The People the Court's decision to require mere
corroboration instead of "nullifying" the identification evidence seemed
to turn on its finding that, despite police showing photos of the appellants
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Lukolongo & Others v. The People (1986) Z.L.R. 115, 128 (Zambia).
Id. at 131-32.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 128 (citing Chisha v. The People (1968) Z.L.R. 26 (Zambia)).
Id. (citing Musonda v. The People (1968) Z.L.R. 98 (Zambia)).
Toko v. The People (1975) Z.L.R. 196, 198 (Zambia).
Id.
Mtonga & Kaonga v. The People (2000) Z.L.R. (Zambia).
Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol20/iss3/2

42

Kahn-Fogel: Beyond Manson and Lukolongo: A Critique of American and Zambian E

2008] BEYOND MANSON AND LUKOLONGO: A CRITIQUE OFAAERICAN AND ZAMBIAN EYEWITNESS LAW

321

to eyewitnesses before a lineup, there was ample opportunity for the
eyewitnesses to view the perpetrators at the time of the crime. 242 The
Mtonga andKaongaopinion provides potential for development of a twotiered test. In such a test, unfair lineup procedures would automatically
require corroboration, and, if there was also a poor opportunity to view the
perpetrators at the time of the crime, the lineup evidence would be
discarded altogether. 43
This would certainly be stronger than Manson, for unfair procedures
would automatically trigger a need for corroborating evidence. There
would also be potential for exclusion of the identification evidence if the
opportunity to view was poor. Nevertheless, the Mtonga and Kaonga
Court did not make that potential rule explicit, and the Court has not
revisited the issue since. As a result, though there have been few published
Zambian opinions dealing with eyewitness law since Lukolongo,
Lukolongo seems to remain the operative rule. In addition to the unfair
lineup procedures described in Lukolongo and Toko, the High Court,
quoting British commentary with approval, has said police should not
describe the suspect to the eyewitness and should not ask the eyewitness,
"'Is that the man? ' ' ' 2 ' Finally, the High Court has stated that there is a
right to have a lawyer present at a lineup.24 5 However, the significance of
this right is dubious at best, given the extreme scarcity of legal aid lawyers
in Zambia, and given that there is no published case in which a Zambian
court has considered the effect of a denial of the right.
One other situation merits brief consideration. In Manongo v. The
People, Justice Silungwe, writing for the Supreme Court, said that failure
to hold a lineup at all may, "in a suitable case result in acquittal." '46 In
Manongo, the failure to hold a lineup did not, however, lead to reversal of
the conviction because an eyewitness who had previously known the
appellant had also made an identification, thus corroborating the showup
identifications by the victims. 47 Thus, the Lukolongo rule also seems
applicable to the failure to hold a lineup at all.248

242. Id.
243. Id.
244. The People v. Kamwandi (1972) Z.L.R. 131, 136 (Zambia) (quoting HALSBURY'S LAWS
OF ENGLAND, 3d ed., vol. 10, 439-40 (1952)) (Need to check Halsbury's to confirm accuracy of
quote and date of publication of 3d ed. Have not been able to get a copy of this).
245. The People v. Chimbala (1973) Z.L.R. 118, 124 (Zambia).
246. Manongo v. The People (1981) Z.L.R. 152, 156 (Zambia).
247. Id.
248. In one case after Manongo, the Supreme Court reversed a murder conviction where an
eyewitness made a courtroom identification, but police had failed to conduct a lineup, there was
no reliable corroborating evidence, and, ultimately the prosecution had failed to establish even the
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The Zambian Supreme Court's holding in Lukolongo, like the Stovall
rule, has great potential to enhance the accuracy of results in criminal trials
by deterring law enforcement from using procedures that increase the
likelihood of mistaken identification. Unlike Manson, the rule creates an
automatic consequence to procedural unfairness: if police conduct an
unfair lineup, evidence from the tainted procedure cannot support
conviction without corroboration. This alone likely makes Lukolongo a
more powerful deterrent against suggestive police procedures than
Manson, and perhaps Stovall, given that the prohibition on "unfairness" in
a lineup provides more clarity to judges than the ambiguous determination
of "unnecessary suggestiveness. '249 Courts in the United States, under both
Stovall and Manson, have demonstrated their desperate need for guidance
on the issue by regularly finding that horribly unfair procedures are not
unnecessarily suggestive.250 On the other hand, the Zambian Supreme
Court has not shied away from finding suggestive procedures "unfair" and
has required corroboration in such circumstances.2
Yet, as summarized above, Lukolongo remains insufficient to protect
Zambian defendants against unreliable eyewitness evidence for three
significant reasons. First, despite its formulation as a strict rule, Lukolongo
suffers from the same deficiency as Stovall. Without sufficient guidance
on the full array of practices that may render a lineup unfair, courts are left
to make the determination on their own. In turn, courts may, as in Stovall,
be unlikely to recognize the unfairness of many unsound identification
techniques when confronted with them. In fact, there is no record in
Zambian case law of any judicial awareness of even the basic best
practices the AP/LS subcommittee recommended.
At the very least, Zambian judges should be aware of the importance
of blind lineup administration, of obtaining contemporaneous statements
of eyewitness confidence and opportunity to view at the time of the crime,
of informing eyewitnesses of the possibility of perpetrator absence, and of
best practices for selecting lineup fillers in ways that do not make the
suspect stand out. Zambian lawyers should make efforts to inform the
courts of what eyewitness science has revealed over the course of the last
generation. To initiate this process, the first necessary step will be to
educate lawyers, equipping them with the knowledge they need to ensure

cause of death of the apparent victim. See Lubinda v. The People (1988) Z.L.R. 110, 112 (Zambia).
249. Lukolongo & Others v. The People (1986) Z.L.R. 115, 128-29 (Zambia).
250. Marson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 117 (1977); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301
(1967).
251. Mtonga & Kaonga v. The People (2000) Z.L.R. (Zambia) (requiring corroboration where
witnesses saw photos of appellant shortly before lineup); Lukolongo (1986) Z.L.R. at 128.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol20/iss3/2

44

Kahn-Fogel: Beyond Manson and Lukolongo: A Critique of American and Zambian E

2008] BEYOND MANSON AND LUKOLONGO: A CRITIQUE OF AMERICAN AND ZAMBIAN EYE WITNESS LA W 323

courts take notice of that science. Once Zambian courts do so, it could
significantly strengthen the Lukolongo judgment.
A second reason Lukolongo offers inadequate security against tainted
eyewitness evidence is that, even if police subjected a defendant to an
unfair lineup, the effect is not to exclude the flawed evidence from
consideration. Instead, corroborating evidence is required to support the
tainted eyewitness identification, which can still contribute to conviction.
The inherent nature of a requirement for supporting evidence clearly
suggests that this is so. Moreover, Zambian courts have stated decisively
that such flawed evidence may still play a part in proving guilt. In Kabala
andMasefu v. The People,the Supreme Court, deciding appeals of robbery
convictions, noted that police who placed appellants with visible facial
injuries in a lineup in which other participants had no such injuries
provided a clue to the witnesses as to the identity of the suspects. 2
Nonetheless, the Court held that, "this does not necessarily mean that the
identification, as such, was worthless; all that it means is that, standing
alone, that evidence is not sufficient to connect the appellants with the
offence committed... 253 Again, in Kenneth Mtonga and Victor Kaonga
v. The People, Justice Ngulube wrote for the Supreme Court that police
showing pictures of the appellants to eyewitnesses before a lineup would
not "nullify" the identification.254 Rather, all that was required was
additional evidence to support the lineup evidence. 5 In contrast, in the
United States where courts relying on Manson find eyewitness evidence
unreliable, the flawed evidence is rendered inadmissible and cannot
contribute to a conviction. 6 Mtonga and Kaonga seems to provide
potential for development of a directive to exclude tainted eyewitness
evidence when the lineup was unfair and there was a poor opportunity to
view the perpetrators during the crime, but this remains unclear.257
Finally, Lukolongo's potential to protect defendants facing tainted
eyewitness evidence is diminished because the evidence used to
corroborate flawed identifications may itself be the fruit of illegal police
procedures. In Liswaniso v. The People,258 a 1976 decision, the Zambian
252. Kabala & Masefu v. The People (1981) Z.L.R. 102, 106 (Zambia).
253. Id. at 107.
254. Mtonga andKaonga (2000) Z.L.R. (Zambia).
255. Id.
256. The U.S. Supreme Court cleared up confusion over whether due process analysis required
separate tests for admissibility of in-court and out-of-court identification evidence in 1972 in Niel
v. Biggers,when it declared the same due process standard would apply to in-court and out-of-court
identification evidence. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972).
257. Mtonga andKaonga (2000) Z.L.R. (Zambia).
258. Liswaniso v. The People (1976) Z.L.R. 277 (Zambia).
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Supreme Court rejected Mapp v. Ohio, in which the U.S. Supreme Court
formulated the exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 9 In Liswaniso, the appellant, an assistant police
inspector, had been convicted on a corruption charge for receiving a bribe
to release an impounded car to its owner. 260 However, the detective on the
case obtained physical evidence, the bribe money, by falsifying a search
warrant, swearing he believed the money to be in the appellant's house at
a time when the detective himself had the money, prior to initiating the
pre-arranged bribe.261
Article 19 of Zambia's constitution at the time, which used identical
language to the current constitution's Article 17,262 stated that "[e]xcept
with his own consent, a person shall not be subjected 'to the search of his
person or his property or the entry by others onto his premises. 2 63 Of
course, this provision was subject to limitations including the allowance
for searches conducted with valid warrants. 264 However, in Liswaniso, the
Zambian Court held that even illegally obtained evidence would be
admissible because such evidence is "a fact (i.e. true) regardless of
whether5 or not it violates a provision of the Constitution or some other
26
law.

,

The Liswaniso Court's holding extended beyond evidence procured
through illegal search warrants to include all illegally obtained physical
evidence, including evidence secured as a result of an involuntary
confession. 2 6 This broad ruling severely compromised the rights of
criminal defendants in Zambia, where, even before Liswaniso, there had
been a sordid history of human rights abuse. In fact, in several Zambian
267
eyewitness cases Courts found credible evidence of coerced confessions,
and physical evidence has often played a role in corroborating faulty
eyewitness evidence.268

259. Mapp extended thejudgment ofWeeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,393 (1914), which
had applied the exclusionary rule to federal courts, to all state courts as well. Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961).
260. Liswaniso v. The People (1976) Z.L.R. 277, 279 (Zambia).
261. Id.
262. ZAMBIA CONST. (Constitution Act No. 18 of 1996) art. 17.
263. ZAMBIA CONST. (Constitution Act of 1973) art. 19.
264. Liswaniso (1976) Z.L.R. at 280.
265. Id. at 287.
266. Id.
267. Lukolongo & Others v. The People (1986) Z.L.R. 115, 124 (Zambia); Chimbo & Others
v. The People (1982) Z.L.R. 20,24 (Zambia); Mkandawire & Others v. the People (1978) Z.L.R.
46, 52 (Zambia).
268. Kalongav. The People (1988) Z.L.R. 90,91 (Zambia); Lukolongo (1986) Z.L.R. at 129
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According to the Supreme Court in Liswaniso, the only remedy for
defendants facing illegally obtained evidence would be criminal or civil
sanctions for the offending police officer.269 Yet the possibility of private
civil actions, at least, remains remote for average criminal defendants,
especially given the severe shortage of lawyers to try such cases. In the
end, Liswaniso reinforced a culture of law enforcement disrespect for
human rights, increasing the likelihood of police being able to engage in
abusive investigation techniques with impunity. The decision imperils the
integrity of trials with flawed eyewitness evidence and of Zambia's entire
criminal justice system.

VI. CONCLUSION

Ultimately, courts in the United States and in Zambia must reform their
respective approaches to eyewitness evidence. Yet, as argued above, it is
unclear in the United States whether retention of a standard-like reliability
test or reversion to a per se exclusionary rule would best strike the balance
between deterring unreliable police procedures and admitting relevant
proof of guilt. Even if courts in the United States do retain a reliability test
to determine admissibility, the Manson reliability factors must be revised
so as not to conflict with science. Additionally, even if United States
courts continue to rely on a totality of the circumstances standard, they
must have more rule-like guidance at least in the initial determination of
what constitutes an unnecessarily suggestive procedure.
Analysis of the Zambian situation must, however, lead to a different
conclusion. Given the history of threats to judicial independence and of
human rights abuse in Zambia, Zambian courts must exercise
extraordinary vigilance to ensure police do not engage in practices likely
to corrupt the results of criminal trials. As Justice Scalia noted, rules can
both constrain and embolden the judiciary.27 ° Use of bright-line rules in
eyewitness law may make it easier for Zambian judges to withstand
external pressure and more difficult for corruption to impede the reliability
of judicial decisionmaking.
The lack of adequate legal training for the majority of Zambian
magistrates also makes judicial discretion on a case by case basis
problematic. Direct application of background values through flexible

(Zambia); Mukwakwa v. The People (1978) Z.L.R. 347, 349 (Zambia); Mkandawire and Others
v. The People (1978) Z.L.R. at 49, 54 (Zambia).
269. Liswaniso, 1978 Z.L.R. at 286 (Zambia).
270. Scalia, supra note 8, at 1179-80.
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standards requires the analytical wherewithal to sort through intricate
variations in factual situations and a deep understanding of how those
variations may affect the values at stake. Without university-level legal
training, many of the Zambian magistrates who oversee criminal cases
may lack the competence to make such complex judgments reliably.
Finally, the near certainty that any given defendant will not have
meaningful legal representation makes the need for clear-cut rules
prohibiting unfair eyewitness identification practices and providing
consequences for non-compliance all the more dire. With the criminal
process so drastically stacked against the accused, provision for automatic
repercussions for procedural impropriety in the conduct of eyewitness
procedures has the potential to prevent admission of unreliable evidence
to a far greater extent than a standard-like directive.
As documented by authors like B.O. Nwabueze, Muna Ndulo, and H.
Kwasi Prempeh, many of the problems described above persist throughout
Commonwealth Africa. Thus, the recommendation for strict rules in
eyewitness law in Zambia is likely equally salient regionally. Additionally,
to the extent that developing countries throughout the world share crises
regarding judicial independence, human rights abuse, and paucity of legal
resources, rules are also likely superior in this area of the law throughout
the developing world.
In Zambia, courts have already demonstrated a willingness to embrace
strict rules in the realm of eyewitness identification law. The current rule
in Lukolongo could be significantly strengthened, however, by providing
courts with detailed guidance on the range of factors that make lineups
unfair and unreliable and by converting the corroboration requirement into
a rule that evidence from unfair lineups must be quashed entirely. This will
take time, but the goal is entirely within reach. If Zambian courts take
notice of the science of eyewitness identification, implementation of
reforms such as those the AP/LS subcommittee recommended would be
relatively straightforward. None of these reforms requires serious
expenditure, and all could be taught easily to law enforcement personnel.
However, the first necessary step in the process will be to educate
Zambian lawyers and judges on the science American lawyers are already
using in efforts to effect reform in the United States.
In assessing the value of extending this Article's analysis beyond the
specific context of eyewitness law in the United States and Zambia, it is
necessary to heed Duncan Kennedy's warning about the difficulty of
generalizing recommendations on the form legal directives should take.
Even so, it is possible at least to extrapolate from the Zambian situation to
surmise that rules-based decisionmaking in the area of eyewitness law may
be suitable in other developing countries, many of which share problems
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like threats to judicial independence, human rights abuse, and scarcity of
legal resources. Moreover, these problems may create an atmosphere in
which bright-line rules can effectuate societal values better than standards
in other areas of the law as well. Nonetheless, this Article does not attempt
to identify those areas specifically. My hope, however, is that in addition
to shedding light on the need for reform of eyewitness law, the Article may
initiate a broader discourse on the issue of legal forms throughout the
developing world.
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